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Today, Latin American and Caribbean legal systems rely heavily on 
public law. Reliance on public law mechanisms is blind to the realities 
of information and incentive constraints.  With government intervention
in the economy, uninformed government officials make decisions from a 
centralized vantage point, and public actors take action without incentives.1 
Centralized legal systems do not mesh well with global economic 
pressures.2  Decision-making and actions become decentralized in the 
private sector.3  Yet, the private sector cannot exist in a legal vacuum. 
Private law enables the private sector to be the main driver of the economy.
Private law as a system of incentives and a means of communication
allows people with information to make decisions and people with 
incentives to take action in the economy.4  Economics needs to be
partnered with law and economics in Latin America and the Caribbean.   
Arguing for a return to Roman law may prove to be the best way to
introduce law and economics into the civil law tradition and to re-privatize
the region’s ailing legal system.5  As I suggest below, Latin American 
law throughout the twentieth century has come to rely overly on public 
law. As a paradigmatic private-law system, Roman law is amenable to a
state-of-the-art fusion with law and economics.  Civil law scholars look
at codified private law as a systematic whole.  However, during much of
the twentieth century, modern legal systems have undergone a process of
“decodification.”6  The systematic nature of the legal system—a
characteristic of civil law systems—has been lost.7  A re-codification of
private law in the Latin America-Caribbean region along the lines of law 
1. See Jean Tirole, Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in 
Organizations, 2 J.L. ECON. &ORG. 181, 181–84 (1986). 
2. See generally Thomas Marschak, On the Comparison of Centralized and 
Decentralized Economies, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1969). 
3. See JUAN JAVIER DEL GRANADO, OECONOMIA IURIS 349 (2010). 
4. Id.
5. See generally Juan Javier del Granado & M.C. Mirow, The Future of the
Economic Analysis of Law in Latin America: A Proposal for Model Codes, 83 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 293 (2008).
6. See generally NATALINO IRTI, LA EDAD DE LA DESCODIFICACION (Bosch ed., 
Luis Rojo Ajuria trans., 1992) (1979). 
7. Id.
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and economics and Roman law is an opportunity to bring new economic 
coherence to these legal systems.  Codification projects are more than an
academic enterprise, they directly cut across the interface between law
and life. 
The Article is organized as follows: The first part of this Article will
introduce Roman private law, and sketch out the law and economics
methodology to be applied to the Roman classical system.  The second
part of this Article will discuss the Roman private law of property,
obligations, as well as commerce and finance.  The third part will
discuss the interaction of private law and private morality in the 
construction of Roman social order.  The fourth part of this Article will
discuss private procedural aspects of the Roman legal system.  The fifth
and final part of this Article will discuss how law and economics can
help civil law scholars in Latin America reorganize their legal systems in
restating private law for the twenty-first century. 
I. WHAT MAKES ROMAN LAW SO ADMIRABLE? 
Law and economics helps us understand why Roman law is still 
worthy of admiration and emulation, and illustrates what constitutes the
“genius” of Roman law.8  This Article argues that one reason for the
success of Rome was its highly efficient legal system and reliance on
private law.9 
Nothing can hide the manner in which Rome’s success resonates
throughout the whole of human history.  Rome is the world’s most 
successful civilization, bar none.10  Rome’s legacy remains ever present: 
8. Between 1852 and 1865, Rudolf von Ihering published his influential work 
DER GEIST DES RÖMISCHEN RECHTS. In 1912, Frederick Pollack published his Carpentier 
lectures delivered at Columbia Law School as THE GENIUS OF THE COMMON LAW. Less
than a century and a half after Ihering and almost a century after Pollack, we are able to 
achieve a much better grasp of the spirit of private law through the economic approach, 
which I explain in Section I.
9. Hans Julius Wolff explains that the “spirit or structure of the system as a 
whole” developed “primarily as private law.” See  ROMAN LAW: AN HISTORICAL 
INTRODUCTION 49, 52–53 (1951).  For the argument in law and economics literature that 
the real underlying cause of the efficiency of Roman law is its private-law character, see 
Juan Javier del Granado et al., The Future of the Economic Analysis of Law in Latin
America: A Proposal for Model Codes, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 293, 304 (2008). 
10. On the expression of Rome as the “eternal city,” see Kenneth J. Pratt, Rome as 
Eternal, 26 J. HIST. IDEAS 25 (1965). In contrast, the vast Han Chinese empire was based 
on the application of public-law principles and the Confucian vision of hierarchical 
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We still use the Roman alphabet and the Roman calendar, Roman
architecture and engineering are still part and parcel of modern life.  Yet,
Rome’s greatness is due as much to Roman law as it is to Roman aqueducts 
and Roman roads. 
Roman private law is admirable because it functioned as an incentive-
compatible communication mechanism, which allowed people to
decentralize the management of resources.11  Roman private law made 
possible a heterarchical social order and a decentralized marketplace
without mediation by public law.  Heterarchy exemplifies an altogether 
different form of social organization.  Most social order in human life is 
based on various forms of hierarchy.  People in a hierarchical social group 
do their duty according to their place in a “chain of being.”12 
“Heterarchy” means “other order.”  In a heterarchy, social rank plays
less of a part. Roman private law is fundamental to the realization of the
basic human aspiration to a social order where hierarchical distinctions 
of class or caste become secondary. 
Civil law scholars have long focused on the key distinction between 
private and public law. Civil law lawyers, compared to common law 
lawyers, are more aware that private law is something radically different
from public law.  My analysis of the Roman system from a law and
economics perspective illustrates how private law is fundamentally different 
from public law. Through the economic approach I hope to throw a new 
light on the private legal order. 
I argue that the admirable character of Roman law is its quality as a
paradigmatic private law system, which makes a heterarchical society
possible.13  Understanding how a system of private law works is relevant
for economic liberalization.14  Private law must play a larger role
as policymakers reduce government regulations and restrictions in a 
marketplace economy, where private-sector actors and decision-makers 
are front and center.  My discussion of Roman law illustrates how private
law aligns incentives for people to exert efforts and share information. 
power structures.  See LASZLO LADANY, LAW AND LEGALITY IN CHINA, THE TESTAMENT
OF A CHINA-WATCHER 33 (1992). 
11. For a robust development of this thesis, see GRANADO, OECONOMIA IURIS, supra
note 3.
12. For a discussion of the Greek idea that inequality is the natural order of things,
see the classic study by ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING; A STUDY OF 
THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1936).
13. For a magisterial treatment in English, see REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW
OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION (1990) [hereinafter
ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS].  As a primer, David Johnston’s ROMAN LAW 
IN CONTEXT (1999) is unsurpassed. 
14. Unfortunately, the literature on economic liberalization focuses on public-law 
variables. See, e.g., Glen Biglaiser & David S. Brown, The Determinants of Economic 
Liberalization in Latin America, 58 POL. RES. Q. 671 (2005). 
304
GRANADO (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2012 10:33 AM     
  




























    
  
    
  
[VOL. 13:  301, 2011] The Genius of Roman Law
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
Roman private law also enables people who face resource, incentive, and
information constraints to act in their own interest and, when efficient, to
take precautions on behalf of others.  Without the law of obligations as 
provided in Roman private law, people cannot reasonably be expected to
act in the interest of others.  Moreover, without the law of property as 
provided in Roman private law, people will expend little effort, even in 
furtherance of their own interest.15 
In nations where the legal system betrays an overreliance on public 
law, such as Latin American countries, government officials lack the 
incentives to take action and the information to make decisions.16  At the
risk of sounding redundant, in the Roman economy, Roman private law 
provided information to those who made decisions or delegated decision-
making to those who possessed the information.  Roman private law also
provided incentives to those who took action or delegated action-taking 
to those who possessed the incentives. 
For purposes of this Article, “Roman law” means the legal system of
the Roman classical period, from about 300 B.C. to about 300 A.D.17  I
will not attempt the job of being or trying to be a legal historian in this 
Article. In the manner of German pandect science, let us stipulate that I 
may choose certain parts of classical Roman law as being especially
noteworthy to the design of an ideal private law system.  This Article
discusses legal scholarship from the ius commune or common law of
Europe during the high Middle Ages.  This Article will also discuss a
15. Communist dictatorships, which abolished private property in the twentieth
century, decreed a legislative and constitutional duty to work.  See David Ziskind, 
Fingerprints on Labor Law: Capitalist and Communist, 4 COMP. LAB. L. 99 (1981).  For
example, the Bolshevik revolutionaries turned the old catchphrase that “those who do not 
work should not eat,” originally meant for capitalists who lived off the labor of others, 
against Soviet workers.  Leon Trotsky went so far as to suggest that the labor force be 
organized along the line of military-style hierarchies.  See  JAMES BUNYAN, THE ORIGIN 
OF FORCED LABOR IN THE SOVIET STATE, 1917–1921 (1967). 
16. For a discussion of the region’s failed law as the underlying narrative of law 
and development literature, see Jorge L. Esquirol, The Failed Law of Latin America, 56 
AM. J. COMP. L. 75 (2008). 
17. My advice is to limit your reading in English on this inordinately complex 
subject to the scholarship of Alan Watson and the writing of Fritz Schulz.  Schulz’s
CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW (1951) is a readable and reliable guide which lays out the basic 
system.  The series of monographs by ALAN WATSON, CONTRACT OF MANDATE IN
ROMAN LAW (1961), THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC (1965),
THE LAW OF PERSONS IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC (1967), THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN
THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC (1968), and THE LAW OF SUCCESSION IN THE LATER ROMAN
REPUBLIC (1971), covers the material.  Any student of Roman law may also always profit 
from reading an English translation of Justinian’s Institutes.
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few Greek philosophical ideas which I believe are important in the 
Roman legal system.18 
This Article revisits Roman private law from a law and economics
perspective. However, I would be remiss to assume familiarity with the
economic approach, on the part of scholars or students of Roman law. 
At least since the early 1960s in the United States, legal scholars have 
employed the methodology of mainstream economics, which includes 
cost-benefit analysis, statistics, price theory, the modern assumption of 
ordinal utility and revealed preference, and blackboard game theory.19 
The new interdisciplinary field is variously known as the economic analysis 
of law or simply law and economics.  Moreover, in the last twenty-five
years, the field has undergone a paradigm shift.20  With the Coase 
Theorem,21 transaction cost economics drew a dividing line in the sand 
between legal institutions, where transaction costs are high, and the
marketplace, where transaction costs are low.  Now, mechanism design
theory posits the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem,22 which brings to light
the inextricable link between markets and legal institutions, and pays
close attention to how institutional design affects the information and 
incentive costs that economic actors and decision-makers face.23 
Finally, the “ideal” system based on Roman law will be compared to
modern French and German civil law.  Contemporary German law is an
extreme example of a system that distinguishes between public and 
private law.  German civil law recognizes the private Rechtsordnung
(legal order)24 as a subsidiary source of legal authority,25 yet German
civil law scholars are unable to say precisely what this private legal 
order entails.26  Law and economics scholarship, refashioned in civil law 
18. Do note that the Greek ideas that I consider to have an important role in 
Roman law are quite different from those which philosopher John R. Kroger discusses.
See The Philosophical Foundations of Roman Law: Aristotle, the Stoics, and Roman
Theories of Natural Law, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 905 (2004). 
19. See Eric Talley’s encyclopedia entry, Theory of Law and Economics, in THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 485 (2002).
20. See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1982).
21. For an exposition of what came to be called the Coase Theorem, see Ronald
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW&ECON. 1 (1960). 
22. See R. Myerson & M. Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral
Trading, 29 J. ECON. THEORY 265 (1983). 
23. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal
Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995). 
24. See VOLKMAR GESSNER ET AL., EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURES 65 (1996).
25. See  ROGER BERKOWITZ, THE GIFT OF SCIENCE: LEIBNIZ AND THE MODERN 
LEGAL TRADITION (2005). German civil law recognizes the private Rechtsordnung or 
private legal order, as a source of legal authority that is subsidiary to public law. 
26. On the developing relationship between private and public law in Germany,
see Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, 
Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843 (2006). 
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clothing, clarifies this vital concept in German law.  The contrast made
with such modern law will highlight the thorough-going and all-pervading 
private character of classical Roman law.
I hope this Article contributes to an intriguing new field of research— 
the economic analysis of Roman law.27  The Roman legal system, which 
has been a source of inspiration to legal scholars over the centuries, may
still be relevant to modern law and economics in the twenty-first century.28 
II. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND NUMERUS CLAUSUS IN
ROMAN PRIVATE LAW
In this next part of the Article, I will discuss how Roman private law 
makes reliance upon private effort, private cooperation, and private
commercial and financial intermediation possible and credible. 
A. Roman Law of Property 
1. Clearly Defined Private Domains 
Law and economics literature emphasizes the importance of clearly 
defined property rights,29 yet the literature fails to discuss how the law of
property defines these rights.30  How property rights are defined is of 
central importance to the functioning of the economic system since the
definition of rights makes public the private information that people 
have.31 
27. The paper out of which this Article grew was a centerpiece of the 2009 Rome
meeting of the European Association of Law and Economics, which focused on ancient 
law.
28. Note that Jorge L. Esquirol assigns continuing importance to Roman law in the 
curriculum of Latin American law schools, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 
55 FLA. L. REV. 41, 71 (2003). 
29. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law 
and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001) (discussing law and economics literature on
property law). 
30. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
347 (1967). Thráinn Eggertsson summarizes much of the literature that Demsetz 
spawned in ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS (1990).  For more recent discussions, see
the June 2002 symposium issue of the JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES on the Evolution of 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331–S672 (2002). 
31. People observe the external world and interpret the facts of their external life.
Because people privately observe their power over the external world of the things they
possess in fact, these observations are private information and information asymmetries
develop between what they know in private and what is publically known.  Property
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Roman law defines property using the principle of numerus clausus, 
which refers to the conception of property in a “closed number” of
standardized forms.32  Roman civil law recognizes property ex iure
Quiritum (according to the principles of civil law) and Roman Praetorian
law recognizes property in bonis habere (among his goods).  Ancient 
Roman law developed separately for citizens and for foreigners.  Quiritary
legal forms33 applied to Roman citizens, while bonitary forms34 applied
to foreigners. However, these typical forms of property were unified for
all practical purposes in 212 A.D. with the promulgation of the Constitutio 
Antoniniana.  This imperial edict extended Roman citizenship to all 
the inhabitants of the empire, thus ending the segregated property law
system and unifying the two forms into one.  By the end of the classical 
period, the terms mancipium (taken by the hand),35 dominium (ownership)36 
and proprietas (property37) were used interchangeably to denote Roman 
typical property.  Whatever the form, Roman property was conceived of 
in terms of a typical bundle of rights, which scholars have inferred from 
the Roman texts to have included the rights of the holder to use, enjoy 
and dispose of everything that lies within a domain.38  Property holders
enjoyed these rights exclusively, that is, they were able to exclude others
from the use, enjoyment, and disposition of resources which fell within 
privately-held domains.39 
While Roman property consisted of a bundle of rights,40 Roman 
lawyers also formulated unbundled property rights in a “closed number” 
of standardized forms.  These iura in re aliena (rights over another’s 
property)41 were limited to seruitutes praediorum (servitudes attached to 
rights that make this private information public and remove the information
asymmetries. See  NARAYAN DIXIT, ACADEMIC DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 12 (2007)
(defining asymmetric information).
32. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) (explaining the numerous
clausus principle).
33. Quiritary ownership was the standardized form of property that a Roman 
citizen acquired under the principles of civil law.  See  ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC
DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 442 (1953).
34. Bonitary ownership was the standardized form of property that the magistrates
introduced, and which could be held by a non-Roman citizen.  See  BERGER, supra note 
33, at 495. 
35. BERGER, supra note 33, at 574. 
36. Id. at 441. 
37. Id. at 658. 
38. See GEOFFREY SAMUEL, EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHOD IN LAW 153 (2003). 
39. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 47.10.13 (Ulpianus, Ad Edictum, 7). 
40. Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle of Rights, 32 VT. L. REV. 247 
(2007) (discussing property as a bundle of rights). 
41. BERGER, supra note 33, at 530.  These standardized forms of unbundled 
property rights entitled someone, other than the owner, to make a certain use of another’s 
property.
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immovable property), 42 usus fructus (right to use another’s property and
take fruits therefrom)43 and usus et habitatio (right to use another’s property
without a right to the fruits, or right of dwelling in another’s house).44  I
discuss typical security interests in another’s property, also considered 
iura in re aliena, such as fiducia cum creditore contracta (trust concluded 
with a creditor), datio pignoris (giving a pledge) and pignus conuentum
(an agreed upon pledge) in Section II.C.45 
In seruitutes praediorum, the rights of exclusion are partly unbundled 
from the property to which they refer.  These rights are instead tied to
the property of a neighbor who is entitled to exclude the property holder 
from interfering with his passage or conveyance of water through the 
property.46  This interpretation echoes the modern insights of the law and 
economics movement into the exclusive nature of private property,47 and 
it is consistent with the Roman conception that such a right-of-way gives 
no one any positive right to carry out an act.48  Though common lawyers
speak of positive appurtenant easements, Roman lawyers considered that
any positive right to perform an act had to be clearly established as a 
personal right49 under the law of obligations.50  Accordingly, because
they are not positive rights, seruitutes praediorum are not personal assets
held by the usufructuary,51 but instead run with the dominant property to
which these rights are tied.  Moreover, Roman lawyers recognized that
seruitutes praediorum might exist only to the extent that they prove 
useful to the dominant property.52 
Because unbundled property rights are a burden on bundled property 
rights, Roman lawyers were careful to limit the scope and duration of 
42. BERGER, supra note 33, at 702. 
43. Id. at 755. 
44. Id. at 755, 484. 
45. See FRITZ SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 401–27. 
46. See  ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC,
supra note 17, at 176–202. 
47. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 
730 (1998).
48. J. INST. 8.1.15. 
49. Such a conviction reflects the importance that Roman lawyers attached to the 
distinction between between actiones in rem (real actions) and actiones in personam
(personal actions).  See  WILLIAM WARWICK BUCKLAND, ROMAN LAW & COMMON LAW:
A COMPARISON IN OUTLINE 89–90 (1952).
50. The civil law concept of obligations includes common-law areas such as
contract and tort, and closely related matters.  See id. at 193–96. 
51. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 33.2.1 (Paulus, Ad Sabinum 3). 
52. See JOHNSTON, supra note 13, at 69–70. 
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iura in re aliena.53  In usus fructus the rights of use and of enjoyment of
fruits are partly unbundled from one’s property, and given to another.54 
A limited case is usus et habitatio, in which one is given unbundled 
rights of use only—not rights to enjoy the fruits—of another’s property.55 
However, Roman lawyers did not recognize one’s right to enjoy the
fruits of a domain if he was not entitled to use that domain, “fructus 
quidem sine usu esse non potest” (“the fruits certainly cannot exist 
without the use.”)56  After the right of use—and sometimes the use and 
enjoyment of fruits—were unbundled, the remaining property became 
almost, though not quite, an empty shell, nuda proprietas (mere property),57 
to which the property holder retained the rights of disposition.58  The  
owner remained entitled to alienate or encumber his property as long as 
he did not affect the usufructuary.  He also retained the right to monitor
the use of his property by the usufructuary and could enjoy whatever 
fruits the usufructuary did not collect.59  As Roman lawyers were careful 
to limit the scope and duration of iura in re aliena, Roman law limited
the life of an usus fructus to the life of the usufructuary as well as to
non-fungible things, and prevented the usufructuary from altering the
economic character of the property.60 
The typical forms of property with unbundled rights discussed above 
are all inclusive. As I pointed out, Roman private law only allowed for a
“closed number” of standardized forms of property bundles and of rights 
that could be unbundled.61  The principle of numerus clausus allowed 
everyone in society easily to understand what rights the legal system
gave to a property holder.  All property is legally alike.  Accordingly,
people rationally expect that their experience with the property rights for 
one piece of property will be the same for any other.  The content of 
property rights is also typically the same for any and all property.
The principle of numerus clausus applies in contexts other than
Roman property law, and an example may help clarify the concept:
A dictionary discloses a “closed number” of standardized words.  If 
53. See RUDOLF SOHM, THE INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW 258 (James Crawford Ledlie,
trans., 1892). 
54. See  ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC,
supra note 17, at 203–19. 
55. Id. at 219–21. 
56. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 7.8.14 (Ulpianus, Ad Sabinum 17). 
57. BERGER, supra note 33, at 601. 
58. G A I INSTITVTIONES [INST.’S OF ROMAN LAW BY GAIUS] 2.31, 2.91 (F. de 
Zulueta ed., 1927).
59. See MAX KASER, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 122 (Rolf Dannenbring trans., 1965). 
60. See SCHULZ, supra note 45, at 388. 
61. For a more in-depth discussion of the standardized forms of Roman bundled
property rights and unbundled rights in the property of another, see DEL GRANADO, supra
note 3, at 278–338. 
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standard English, Latin, or any language had an open system, or numerus
apertus of nonstandard words, a speaker would be able to invent or 
create the words he used.  As a result, others might be unable to understand 
him.  In this way, Lewis Carroll’s use of nonstandard words makes the 
meaning of his poem Jabberwocky difficult to understand.62  Roman  
private law, as a means of communication, is “jabberwocky-free.” 
Unlike the common law, Roman law avoids the piecemeal approach 
that would create distinct property regimes for, say, res mobiles (movable 
things)63 and res immobile (immovable things).64  While Roman law
recognizes the differences between these two types of property, under
the principle of numerus clausus, both types of property confer the same 
rights. Note that the distinction between movables and immovables 
acquires some importance after the promulgation of the Constitutio 
Antoniniana in 212 A.D.65 
In keeping with a clear, standardized system of property, each quiritary
domain had boundaries that were clearly defined by the civil law.66  The
German scholar von Ihering offers a folk etymology for “quirites,”
explaining that the Sabine warriors used to carry lances to stake out
property in a way that was highly visible to everyone.67 Romans surveyors
were masters at squaring off real property with terminationes as visible
markers.  The glossator Accursius formulated another boundary principle.
In his gloss on a Roman text, Accursius states that the space above a
property surface must be left unhindered.  Further, the limits of property
extend from the surface in a column down to the center of the earth and 
up to the heavens, “cuius est solum eius est usque ad coelum et ad
inferos,” (“whoever owns the ground it is theirs up to the sky and down to
the depths”).68  His simple and straightforward explanation projected a
clear mental image, which later legists were able to easily grasp. 
62. See THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 94 (Random
House 1946) (1871). 
63. BERGER, supra note 33, at 679. 
64. Id. at 679. 
65. For a discussion of the consequences of the Constitutio Antoniniana, see
ADRIAN NICHOLAS SHERWIN-WHITE, THE ROMAN CITIZENSHIP 215–27 (1973).
66. For a discussion of quiritary and bonitary ownership, see CHARLES PHINEAS
SHERMAN, 2 ROMAN LAW IN THEMODERN WORLD 150 (1917).
67. 1 GEIST DES RÖMISCHEN RECHTS, AUF DEN VERSCHIEDENEN STUFEN SEINER
ENTWICKLUNG ch. 1 (1968). 
68. ACCURSII GLOSSA IN DIGESTUM VETUS (1969) (concerning DIG. OF JUSTINIAN
18.2.1 (Paulus, Ad Sabinum 5)). 
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Just as land had clearly delineated bounds, Roman lawyers recognized
that many movable things also had well-defined boundaries that were 
recognized by law.69  Corporeal things have bodies that we can see, touch, 
and hold, “quae tangi possunt.”70  Roman lawyers understood that many
movable things are contained in themselves, “quod continetur uno spiritu” 
or composed of several things attached to one another, “pluribus inter se 
coherentibus constat,”71 and in some cases are indivisible, “quae sine 
interitu diuidi non possunt.”72  Examples of this last class include animals
that would die or jewels that would lose their value if they were
partitioned.73 
Through the use of a closed number of standardized forms and clearly
defined boundaries, Roman private law reduces asymmetries of information 
between property holders and everyone else.  The private legal system 
minimized the amount of information that people needed to search in
order to recognize the property of others, and to understand their own 
property rights by publicizing the boundaries of private domains and what 
property owners may do with the resources that lie within private
domains. But this is not the sole end of a good property law system.
The legal system must also solve the problem of clearly defining which 
property belongs to what property holder.  As I show in the next 
subsection, Roman law has a unique way of defining and making public 
what property belongs to which property holder.
2. Clearly Publicized Ownership 
The Roman system used ceremonies, rather than a modern registration 
system, to publicize who held what private property.74  Today, most legal
systems in the world use a registration system for valuable property, but 
this is too costly to require for every type of property.75  In Rome’s  
thriving agricultural economy, valuable types of property such as land, 
beasts of draught and burden, seruitutes praediorum for conveying water 
for irrigation purposes, and slaves, were valuable and needed a means to 
69. For a brief discussion of Roman ownership see WILLIAM SMITH, ADICTIONARY OF
GREEK AND ROMAN ANTIQUITIES 421 (2d ed. 1848). 
70. G. INST. 2.13, 2.14. 
71. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 41.3.30 (Pomponius, Ad Sabinum 30). 
72. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 6.1.35.3 (Paulus, Ad edictum 21). 
73. See  WILLIAM LIVESEY BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR 
RELATION TO MODERN LAW 315 (1938).
74. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993) (discussing 
land ownership). 
75. See Joseph Janczyk, An Economic Analysis of the Land Titling Systems for 
Transferring Real Property, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 213 (1977). 
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ensure their ownership was publicly known.76  To perform the functions 
now embedded in registration systems, Roman lawyers developed a solemn
and elaborate ceremony involving bronze and scales to
commemorate the conveyance of private property.77  Ceremonies embed 
new information in the collective memory of a social group.  People 
visibly took part in symbolic acts and wore various forms of outrageous 
clothing that naturally attracted the attention of onlookers.  Thus, the 
memorable ceremony of mancipatio (take with the hand) created
publicly available information about the change in the property’s
ownership.78 Alternatively, Roman law allowed substitution of a public
declaration (after a fictitious trial) with a confirmation before the
praetor, in iure cessio (transfer before the magistrate).79  Sometimes for 
certain types of property, Roman law relied on the collective memory of 
local communities to publicize the identity of the property holder.  For 
non-valuable property, Roman law also presumed ownership from 
possession like modern legal systems.80 
Roman private law protects both property owners and possessors,
though in different ways, as von Ihering explains.81  A property owner 
has a right to claim legal protection, whereas a possessor does not under 
Roman law. Common law lawyers may fail to appreciate civil law debates 
about the legal protection of possession because the common law, unlike 
Roman law, clearly recognizes rights incident to possession.82  In Roman
law, rei uindicatio (vindication of the thing)83 and actiones ad
exhibendum et negativa (actions to exhibit or deny)84 protect property 
right holders while interdicta retinendae et recuperandae possessionis
 76. EPITOME ULPIANI 19.1 (F. Schulz ed., 1926). 
77. On the ceremony involving bronze and scales, see ALAN WATSON, ROMAN 
LAW&COMPARATIVE LAW 45 (1991). 
78. See GYÖRGY DIÓSDI, OWNERSHIP IN ANCIENT AND PRECLASSICAL ROMAN LAW
62 (1970).
79. BERGER, supra note 33, at 496. 
80. Roman law presumed the possessor of property to be the owner, unless 
rebutted by the true owner.  See  THOMAS MACKENZIE, STUDIES IN ROMAN LAW WITH 
COMPARATIVE VIEWS OF THE LAWS OF FRANCE, ENGLAND, AND SCOTLAND 164 (1862).
81. RUDOLPH VON JHERING, DER BESITZWILLE: ZUGLEICH EINE KRITIK DER
HERRSCHENDEN JURISTISCHEN METHODE (1968) (arguing that legal protection of possession
protects the owner because the possessor was frequently the owner). 
82. Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting The Pieces Back Together, 45 
ARIZ. L. REV. 371 (2003) (describing possessory rights as the core of property). 
83. BERGER, supra note 33, at 627. 
84. Id. at 343, 463. 
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(interdicts for the retention or resumption of possession)85 protect
possessors without property rights.  Ultimately, the Roman legal system 
protects both property right holders and possessors in fact to align their 
interests with the development and maintenance of the resources under 
their domain or in their possession.86 
3. Private Management of Resources 
Rather than stipulating how holders were to manage property, Roman
private law created incentives and provided the example of the property
owner, the paterfamilias (father of a family),87 as the basis of the
standard of diligent care to be used in the legal system.88  The choice of 
what a property holder does with his property is left to the owner;
Roman law does not stipulate how a holder may use his property. As the 
“bundle of rights” principle illustrates, “property” generally includes an 
ample range of faculties, uses, attributions, and possibilities.  Ownership
thereof enables the holder to exclude others from the use, enjoyment,
and disposition of that property.  In Roman law, property was not held
by the individual, as it primarily is in modern law; rather, property was 
held by the family unit, or more correctly, on its behalf by the head of
that family, called the paterfamilias, who personally manages the property.
The paterfamilias will be further discussed below in Section II.C. 
While Roman law left largely unstipulated what a holder could or 
could not do with his property, it stopped short of conferring absolute 
rights to property holders.89  If the legal system conferred absolute rights
without taking into account the effects that one’s use of property may
have on another’s, property values may diminish.90  Accordingly,
Roman law established limits that controlled external effects created by
the use of property.  For example, a property holder in an apartment-
block may not operate a taberna casearia, (cheese factory)91 that causes 
nauseating odors for the neighbors above unless he acquires a seruitus.92 
He also may not flood the property of his neighbors below.93  Within  
85. Id. at 508. 
86. See  ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC,
supra note 17, at 91–109. 
87. BERGER, supra note 33, at 377. 
88. BRUCEW. FRIER & THOMAS A.J. MCGINN, A CASEBOOK ON ROMAN FAMILY LAW
239 (2004).
89. UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 27–67 (1997). 
90. RUDOLPH VON JHERING, supra note 81 (explaining that certain limits on property
increase its value).
91. On Roman shops, see CHRISTOPHER FRANCESE, ANCIENT ROME IN SO MANY 
WORDS 155 (2007).
92. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 8.5.8.5 (Paulus, Ad edictum 21). 
93. Id.
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limits set on a case-by-case basis in the Roman texts, the law leaves the
choice of use of property to the arbitrium (judgment) of the property
holder.94 The Roman solution is superior at maximizing the value of
property rights because Roman private law controlled external effects
from within property law itself, whereas both common law and modern
civil law use non-property doctrines, such as “nuisance” and “abuse of
rights” to limit property rights.95  These non-property doctrines fail to
maximize the value of property rights because they are framed in general
terms and apply to a wide range of external costs.  The Roman solution 
is limited to specific factual situations.  Therefore under Roman law, 
property limits are predictable and parties can thus anticipate the need
to negotiate servitudes. 
Roman law tied property together using a Gordian knot of wide-ranging
typical rights, which could not be separated out of the bundle (except in 
the “closed number” of specific limited circumstances previously
mentioned).  Ideally, this standardized bundle of property rights was tied
to a single property holder because Roman private law avoided situations of
communio (common ownership)96 reasoning that all rights in the
bundle are largely complementary to one another and thus property loses 
its efficacy if these rights are scattered among several common property
holders other than for a limited time and purpose.
In fact, Roman law’s system of “typical property” tied to one person 
solves a frequently cited problem with jointly held property—the tragedy of
the commons.97  In law and economics, the tragedy of the commons is a 
generalized form of a prisoner’s dilemma with many players.98  In the  
tragedy of the commons, the dominant strategy of each player is not to 
cooperate. Many people who lack coordination and therefore do not 
cooperate fail to maintain a resource commonly owned.  They thereby
condemn the resource to overexploitation and disappearance.99  Demsetz 
94. BERGER, supra note 33, at 366. 
95. Anna di Robilant, Abuse of Rights: The Continental Drug and the Common
Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 687 (2010). 
96. BERGER, supra note 33, at 400. 
97. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
98. In this non-zero-sum game, two people face private incentives to be the first to
reveal private information about a crime.  If they both remained silent, they would both 
escape convictions. See Gordon Tullock, Adam Smith and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 100
Q. J. ECON. 1073 (1985). 
99. Shi-Ling Hsu, What is a Tragedy of the Commons? Overfishing and the 
Campaign Spending Problem, 69 ALB. L. REV. 75 (2005). 
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brought this analysis into law and economics literature.100  Heller discussed 
the flip side of this analysis in his literature.101  The tragedy of the anti-
commons is also a generalized form of a prisoner’s dilemma. However 
under this analysis, property holders, lacking coordination among 
themselves, raise the price of the resource excessively and thereby
condemn the resource to underuse. By removing the need for coordination
within a domain between multiple property owners, Roman law solves 
these joint-property problems.
The word “tragedy” here has the essence of the “inevitable” of Greek 
theater. Law and economics literature has recovered the analysis of the 
tragedy of the commons from Roman law.  Harding’s Malthusian article
attributes the idea to an obscure nineteenth century mathematical amateur.102 
The insight behind it goes back to Greek philosophy.  Aristotle 
refutes Plato’s community of property by explaining that, “³P4FJ" (D
¦B4:g8g . . . "H JL(PV<g4 J` B8g . . . FJT< P@4<`<,” (what is common to 
everyone no one will take care of).103  From this passage in Artistotle, the
tragedy of the commons became a Roman law trope.  Fernando Vázquez de
Menchaca, a late scholastic from the school of Salamanca, fully develops
the analysis of the tragedy of the commons in his sixteenth century treatise 
on the Roman law of property,104 from which Hugo Grotius takes the
analysis without supplying any additional insights.105 
The necessity of public law-implemented coordination of jointly held 
property is eliminated because private property provides owners the 
incentives to acquire information and invest in the development and 
upkeep of the resources that lie within private domains.  Roman property 
law typically gives a single property holder a bundle of rights with respect
to everything in his domain, to the exclusion of the rest of the world. 
The holder thus internalizes the external benefits and costs from the use,
enjoyment, or disposition of the property.  Incentives are aligned with
the care and maintenance of that property because the holder is able to 
put a price on the resources involved.106  Roman private law gives the
right holders the incentives to invest in the maintenance and improvement
 100. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347
(1967).
101. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition 
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). 
102. On the tragedy perspective, see Michael Goldman, “Customs in Common”:
The Epistemic World of the Commons Scholars, 26 THEORY & SOC’Y 1, 25; id. at 1–37
(1997).
103. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. 2 (1988). 
104. FERNANDO VÁZQUEZ DE MENCHACA, CONTROUERSIARUM ILLUSTRIUMALIARUMQUE
USU FREQUENTIUM LIBRI TRES (1934). 
105. HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES (1950).
106. DEL GRANADO, supra note 3, at 305. 
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of property because they are able to reap both the use, value, and the 
exchange value of those resources.107  In short, the economic problems with 
common-held property are avoided in the Roman legal system because a 
single person, the dominus proprietarius, (owner)108 is the residual claimant 
of the resources managed in the domain. 
However, with unbundled property rights such as usus fructus, the 
dominus usufructus, (holder of an usufruct)109 fails to be the residual
claimant of the property.  Since the incentives of the usufructuary are not 
perfectly aligned in the long-term with the management of the resources 
in the domain, Roman private law requires that the usufructuary post a 
bond, the cautio usufructuaria, to guarantee the diligent management of 
the property and its return according to the standard of care of a man of
good judgment, “et usurum se boni uiri arbitratu et, cum usus fructus ad 
eum pertinere desinet, restituturum quod inde exstabit,” (“that will use
the property as a good man should, and that when the usufruct ceases, he
will restore what remains of it”).110  Roman private law requires the
dominus usus (holder of an usus) to post a similar bond, the cautio usuaria, 
for the same reason.111 
4. Institutional Mechanisms of Maintaining Typical 
Property Through Time 
To provide for proper management of resources, Roman law incorporates 
institutional mechanisms that maintain typical property through time.112 
The institutional mechanisms of accessio, (accesion)113 novam speciem
facere, (to make a new kind of thing)114 and confusio uel commixtio,
(confusion and intermingling),115 as well as successio, (inheritance)116 
usucapio, (acquire by use)117 and longi temporis praescriptio, 
107. Id.
 108. BERGER, supra note 33, at 422. 
109. Id. at 385. 
110. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 7.9.1 (Ulpianus, Ad edictum 79). 
111. See  ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC,
supra note 17, at 218. 
112. DEL GRANADO, supra note 3, at 316. 
113. BERGER, supra note 33, at 340. 
114. Id. at 712. 
115. Id. at 399. 
116. Id. at 722. 
117. Id. at 752. 
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(prescription),118 are methods of maintaining typical Roman property as
people, property, and attachments between these elements change
throughout time.  Each will be treated in the following paragraphs.119 
In accessio, one’s property becomes combined with, or incorporated
into, another’s property.120  Instead of establishing communio between 
common property holders, Roman private law subjects the accessory 
property to the dominium of the property holder of the principal property.
Thus, the dominant property holder acquires the accretion in the natural 
area along a river,121 the threads woven into a piece of cloth,122 the dyes
used to process cotton fabric,123 the wood panel containing an oil
painting,124 the writing on a goatskin parchment,125 the buildings put up 
on126 or the crops sown in the ground.127  As is evident from the case
law, Roman private law avoids a situation of communio between common 
property holders whenever possible. 
In novam speciem facere, one applies one’s labor to another’s
materials in order to create a thing of a new species.128  Instead of 
establishing communio between these common property holders, Roman
private law subjects the thing of the new species to the dominium of the
laborer, si ea species ad materiam reduci possit,129 (unless the materials can
be returned to their primitive state).  Thus, the person applying the labor 
acquires the wine made from grapes, the oil pressed from olives, and the 
flour ground from wheat kernels; but not the goblet cast in gold, nor
the clothing made of wool, nor the boat assembled with planks of wood 
belonging to another.130  The goblet can be melted down, the vestment 
can be ripped back into sheets of wool, the boat can be dissembled, and 
the planks stacked singly again and returned to their primitive states. 
In confusio uel commixtio, one’s property becomes confused or
intermingled with another’s property.131 Thus, if the boundary fence comes
118. Id. at 645. 
119. Traditionally, civil lawyers referred to these legal institutions as modes of
“acquiring” property rights.  My law and economics analysis suggests they are, more 
precisely, modes of “maintaining” typical Roman property.
120. See R. A. BURGESS, ACCESSIO AND RELATED SUBJECTS IN ROMAN LAW (1972).
121. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 41.1.7.1 (Gaius, Rerum cottidianarum siue aureorum 2).
122. J. INST. 2.1.26. 
123. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 41.1.26.2 (Paulus, Ad Sabinum 14). 
124. G. INST. 2.72. 
125. G. INST. 2.77. 
126. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 41.1.12 (Neratius, Membranarum 5). 
127. J. INST. 2.1.32. 
128. See SCHULZ, supra note 45, at 366. 
129. J. INST. 2.1.12. 
130. G. INST. 2.79. 
131. See  PAUL VAN WARMELO, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN 
CIVIL LAW 89 (1976). 
318
GRANADO (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2012 10:33 AM     
  




    
 






    
 










   
 
 
[VOL. 13:  301, 2011] The Genius of Roman Law
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
down between two neighboring fields, the flocks of sheep may become 
so intermingled that the farmers are unable to reckon who owns what
animal.  If the intermingling occurs by chance or the will of the property 
holders, Roman law will allow a situation of communio between common
property holders.  If not, and the component things cannot be separated, 
the property holders may ask the iudex  (judge)132 to partition the property 
in proportion to the value that corresponds to each.133 
Through time people move, leave, or perish.  In successio,134 any one 
of the heirs, at any time, is able to ask the iudex to divide an hereditas
(inheritance). 135  In this way, Roman law avoids a situation of communio
among coheirs. 
When property comes to be held by new possessors, Roman private 
law puts an end to the divorce between possession and property through
usucapio and longi temporis praescriptio.136 The possessor acquires
dominium over another’s property through usage over time.137  That  way,  
the legal system assures that every domain is managed by a single property 
holder who has an interest and control over the domain. Roman private law
avoids situations of commonly-held ownership whenever possible. 
The ability to price the resources held within privately held-domains,
and the expectation of becoming property holders, give people incentives to
invest in the conservation and development of the scarce resources that
lie within their control.138  Note that Roman law’s various ways of giving
property rights to a possessor aligns his incentives with the care and
management of the resources in the domain and gives him the expectation 
of obtaining the residual interest over time.  In addition to stability in his
possession, the legal system gives the good faith possessor immediate
property rights over the fruits or products of what he possesses, without 
having to wait for usucapio and longi temporis praescriptio.139
 132. BERGER, supra note 33, at 518. 
133. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 6.1.5.1 (Ulpianus, Ad edictum 16). 
134. For a short discussion of the Roman law of succession, see JOHNSTON, supra
note 13, at 44–52. 
135. BERGER, supra note 33, at 485. 
136. See  ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC,
supra note 17, at 21–61. 
137. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 41.3.3 (Modestinus, Pandectarum 5); 44.3.3 (Modestinus, 
Differentiarum 6). 
138. DEL GRANADO, supra note 3, at 305. 
139. See JOHNSTON, supra note 13, at 59. 
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Roman law relies on typical forms of property bundles, unbundled
property rights, clearly defined boundary markers for property, and
publicized ownership to reduce informational asymmetries.  Roman law 
also employs institutional mechanisms that maintain typical property
through the vagaries of time to avoid situations of communio between
common property holders.  Where a situation of common ownership is 
unavoidable, as in communio incidens, I will show in Section II.B.3 of 
this Article that Roman private law turns communio into a quasi contract 
under the law of obligations.  That way the legal system provides a legal
mechanism for coordination of commonly-held ownership. 
In law and economics, an Edgeworth box graphically represents how 
people can benefit from exchange.140  Goods have both a use value and
an exchange value.  This analysis again goes back to Greek philosophy. 
People will not enter into exchanges if they hold like things.  How, then, can 
people find an equivalence between unlike things to make an equal 
exchange?  In a brilliant response to this paradox, Aristotle observes that a 
voluntary exchange is, “6"Jx •<"8@( . . . " :¬ 6"J ÆF`J0J",” (“equivalent 
even if it is not equal”).141  However, a voluntary exchange requires more
than mere possession in fact; it requires property rights.142  Otherwise,  
the asymmetry of information between possessors may defeat attempts at
barter. Even a barter economy requires property rights. Moreover,
the law of property supports the market.  As I explain above, rights of
exclusion are logically prior to the pricing mechanism.
Hernando de Soto, a Peruvian economist, has strongly urged developing
countries to create property titling programs.143  During the last twenty-
five years, many developing countries, including a large number in Latin 
America, have followed de Soto’s policy recommendations. The 
intended beneficiaries of these programs are the urban poor.   Because the 
urban poor generally live and work in the informal economy, they
traditionally do not hold recognized legal title to their assets. Therefore,
they have been unable to post collateral for bank loans needed to 
improve their productivity.  Nevertheless, these well-intended titling 
programs have failed to produce the expected, substantial economic
growth.  This Article provides an explanation for the failure of these 
titling programs.  Because de Soto is a development economist rather 
than a law and economics scholar, his analysis is incomplete. Our short
explanation of Roman law shows how an ideal private law system defines
140. See RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS 6–14 (2005). 
141. ARISTOTLE, 5 THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (1998).
142. See DEL GRANADO, supra note 3, 296. 
143. See THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD (1989)
(arguing that property titling programs can spark economic development). 
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property, even without land registration systems.  Our law and economics 
perspective suggests that for the legal system to define and maintain 
property rights, more than a simple registration system is required. 
B. Roman Law of Obligations 
1. Private Choices to Cooperate 
Law and economics literature is still under development with respect
to contract law.144  The economic approach, in the hands of common law 
lawyers, seems unable to posit an “economic theory” of contract law.145 
Law and economics models fail to explain contract doctrines as they
exist under the common law.  These models also fail to provide a
conceptual framework for a critical reworking of the common law
system.146  The historical origins of common law doctrines of contract in
Canon law, rather than in Roman law, give common law lawyers a
substantially incomplete picture of contracts.147  Roman law reveals the
full range of possible mechanism designs in the law of obligations. 
Where common law lawyers seem to be spinning their wheels, Roman
legal scholarship is able to uniquely contribute to our understanding of 
this area of the economic analysis of law.  Canon lawyers put Roman
contract law on its head.  Since in Canon Law, contracts were usually
accompanied by an oath, contractual breach amounted to the sin of
perjury.  Canon lawyers were concerned for the soul of promisors, and 
concluded that all promises should be kept, “pacta sunt seruanda.” The
common law action of assumpsit follows the Canon law action of breach
of faith, fidei laesio.148 
Roman private law encourages economic liberalization because it
supports private choices to cooperate. Yet, cooperation requires credible
commitments, which themselves require that the committed parties have 
144. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: 
Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829 (2003) (discussing the failure of law and 
economics literature to explain contracts law). 
145. Id. at 830. 
146. Id.
147. See Juan Javier del Granado, The Path Dependence of the Common Law from
a Romanist Perspective (Aug. 3, 2011) (paper presented in Bogotá at the 15th annual 
meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean Law and Economics Association), 
http://escholarship.org/uc/bple_alacde.
148. See A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE
RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT 5–6 (1975). 
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the incentives to comply in the future.149 The Roman law of contractual
obligations provides such incentives and therefore encourages expectations 
of cooperation between private parties. In law and economics, this is a 
beneficial outcome because trust between people has economic value.150 
The Roman law of obligations enables people to commit to future
actions in a legally binding contract.  The debtor who enters into a
contract gives the creditor a legal claim against his person (actiones in 
personam), thus rendering his commitment to future action credible 
when made.  Without such legal support for commitment, we would be 
forced to use more extreme measures as demonstrated by Hernan Cortes,
the sixteenth century Spanish conquistador who burned his ships in the 
harbor of Veracruz to foreclose the option of retreat during the conquest 
of Mexico.151 
Part of the credibility of obligations under Roman law is the
distinction between actiones in rem (see supra Section II.A) and actiones in
personam.152 Under the Roman law of obligations, if the debtor breaches,
the creditor is able to force him, through an actio in personam, to pay an
amount of money equal to, but not more than, the value of the
performance.153  Even where the obligation is incertum (uncertain),154 
the procedural formula stipulates that the iudex must assess, tantum 
pecuniam (an amount of money equal) to quidquid Numerius Negidius 
Aulum Agerium dare facere oportet, (whatever the defendant ought to
give to, or do for, the plaintiff).155  Accordingly, when performance
becomes more costly to the debtor than the value of the performance to 
the creditor, the system of Roman private law allows the debtor to breach 
and pay monetary damages through the principle of omnis condemnatio 
est pecunaria (all judgments are for monetary damages).156  The contract 
restructures the future incentives of the debtor and makes his promises
credible. Unlike modern civil and common law systems, the classical
Roman iudex uniquely refused to issue decrees of specific performance.
149. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 562 (2003). 
150. See Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1717 (2006). 
151. Letter from Hernan Cortes to Emperor Charles V (Oct. 30, 1520), in 1 CARTAS
DE RELACIÓN DE LA CONQUISTA DE MÉJICO (1922). Without such legal support for 
commitment, we would be forced to use other more extreme measures as demonstrated
by Hernan Cortes, the sixteenth century Spanish conquistador who burned his ships in 
the harbor of Veracruz to foreclose the option of retreat during the conquest of Mexico. 
152. BERGER, supra note 33, at 346. 
153. See ZIMMERMANN, supra note 13, at 771. 
154. BERGER, supra note 33, at 387. 
155. See ZIMMERMANN, supra note 13, at 771. 
156. G. INST. 2.31. 
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The Roman contract system transforms the private expectations that
people hold about the future actions of others into public information by
utilizing an appropriate ceremony or standardized contract forms.157  The  
legal system adopts the same institutional mechanisms, long-winded
verbal statements in ceremonies and a “closed number” of standardized 
forms as those used in the Roman law of property (see supra Section
II.A). As we saw earlier, modern civil law systems substitute the entry 
of public records in registration systems for the ceremonies of classical
Roman law.158  Through the use of standardized forms and clearly stipulated
obligations, Roman private law reduces asymmetries of information 
between contractual parties.  
Scholars today dispute whether Roman law, in archaic times, required 
contractual parties to participate in a ceremony involving bronze and 
scales in order to enter into an enforceable agreement.159  If such a
ceremony existed, its purpose was to subject parties to seizure if they
failed to perform an obligation.160  The ceremony openly established the
parties as nexus (bound).161  However, under the legal system of the Roman 
classical period, the most important ceremonial means of forming binding 
legal commitments was the verbal question-and-answer sequence of
stipulatio, (stipulation).162  In the immediate presence of each other and 
before witnesses, the reus stipulandi (stipulator)163 asks the question, and 
the reus promittendi (promissor)164 responds directly with a promise in 
terms that mirror the question. Dari spondes?  Spondeo.  Dabis? Dabo. 
Promittis?  Promitto.  Fidepromittis?  fidepromitto.  Fideiubes?  Fideiubeo. 
Facies? Faciam,165 (“Do you agree?  I do agree.  Do you promise?  I do 
promise.  Do you pledge your faith?  I do pledge my faith.  Do you bind 
yourself?  I do bind myself.  Will you give?  I will give.  Will you do so-
157. See DEL GRANADO, supra note 3, at 319. 
158. On civil-law notary publics, see Armando J. Tirado, Notarial and Other
Registration Systems 11 FLA. J. INT’L L. 171, 174 (1996). 
159. On the controversial nexum, see Max Kaser, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 167 (Rolf
Dannenbring trans., 1965); de Zulueta, The Recent Controversy Over Nexum, 29 L. Q.
REV. 137 (1913). 
160. See ALAN WATSON, ROME OF THE XII TABLES: PERSONS AND PROPERTY 111–24 
(1975).
161. BERGER, supra note 33, at 595–96. 
162. Id. at 716. 
163. Id. at 684. 
164. Id.
 165. J. INST. 3.15. 
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and-so? I will do so-and-so.”)166  Accordingly, Roman law enables the
parties to stipulate to a mutually understood unilateral obligation, which
is legally enforceable as a contract. (See Section II.C below for a
discussion of the literal contractual form).
Besides a ceremony, the other Roman method of publicizing private 
agreements was by use of standardized contract forms.167  Parties during 
the classical period were able to form binding legal commitments by
concluding any one of a “closed number” of standardized forms,
eliminating the need for long drawn-out ceremonial verbal statements.168 
The typical contracts under Roman law were either consensu (consensual)
or re (real).169 The parties were able to form a consensual contract simply 
by manifesting their agreement.170  The parties were able to form a real 
contract simply by handing over res corporales (a corporeal thing)171 
while manifesting assent to such a standardized contract form with a
name.  Because Justinian was particularly fond of the number four, the
system of pandects identifies four consensual contracts, emptio uenditio 
(purchase sale),172 locatio conductio (let hire),173 mandatum (mandate)174 
and societas (partnership),175 as well as four real contracts, depositum
(deposit),176 mutuum (gratuitous loan for consumption),177 commodatum
(gratuitous loan for use)178 and pignus (pledge).179 
The typical contracts—referred to as the “nominate contracts” because
they are named—are one of the greatest achievements of Roman private
law.180  By referring to a nominate contract, the parties knew that they
had concluded an enforceable contract and easily understood what
obligations they had assumed without having to stipulate them in
detail.181  To illustrate, when the parties entered into an emptio uenditio, 
166. Translation taken from S.P. SCOTT, 2 THE CIVIL LAW 111 (1932). Note that I
retain the Latin terms throughout the article, because the translation of legal terms is
invariably imprecise and possibly misleading. 
167. See DEL GRANADO, supra note 3, at 319. 
168. Interestingly, law and economics scholars have failed to see that the numerus 
clausus principle also operates in the law of obligations.
169. See ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF THE ANCIENT ROMANS 64–72 (1970). 
170. See JOHNSTON, supra note 13, at 78.
 171. BERGER, supra note 33, at 677. 
172. Id. at 452. 
173. Id. at 567. 
174. Id. at 574. 
175. Id. at 708. 
176. Id. at 432. 
177. Id. at 591. 
178. Id. at 399. 
179. Id. at 630. 
180. See DEL GRANADO, supra note 3, at 319–20. 
181. Id. 
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they only had to specifically stipulate the pretium (price)182 and the res
(thing).183  However, the obligation of the seller to respond for eviction, 
euictionem praestare, (guarantee against eviction) was created without
being mentioned because it was part of the typical contract invoked by 
the name, emptio uenditio.184 Thus, the parties took on all implied
obligations of an emptio uenditio by giving their contract that name. 
Modern law and economics teaches that when one party is better able 
to anticipate future contingencies and risks than the other, mutually 
beneficial transactions may fail to take place.  Roman law encourages such 
mutually beneficial contracts by incentivizing revelation of privately-held
information through default rules.185  Roman law enables parties to stipulate
out of implicit legal rules that are not essential to the standard contractual 
form.186  For example, when the parties enter into an emptio uenditio, the 
parties may agree that the seller not respond for eviction by using something 
called a pactum de non praestanda euictione (proviso to exclude guarantee
against eviction).187  The seller who has private information about any 
circumstance which may affect the peaceful possession of a thing by the 
buyer responds for eviction as an implicit obligation.  Accordingly, Roman
private law provides parties an incentive to reveal private information to 
avoid the responsibility that the legal system imposes by default. 
While the Roman legal system allows some modifications of the typical 
forms, it prevents formation of agreements that change the essential
features of a standardized contractual form.188  Thus, the parties are unable
to agree to a commodatum in exchange for merces (rent),189 which makes
the transaction something other than a gratuitous loan.190  The Roman 
lawyers indicated that such a transaction would have to be enforced by
another legal action ex locatione conductio (for the lease of the thing).191
 182. BERGER, supra note 33, at 649. 
183. Id. at 677. 
184. See  ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC,
supra note 17, 40–45, 70–86. 
185. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertnert, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (discussing how parties 
reveal information when they contract around default provisions).
186. See DEL GRANADO, supra note 3, at 328. 
187. See FRANCIS DE ZULUETA, THE ROMAN LAW OF SALE 46 (1945).
188. See DEL GRANADO, supra note 3, at 328. 
189. BERGER, supra note 33, at 581. 
190. See  FERDINAND MACKELDEY, HANDBOOK OF THE ROMAN LAW 337 (Moses A. 
Dropsie trans. 1883). 
191. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 13.6.5 12 (Ulpianus, Ad Edictum 28). 
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In the Roman contractual system, any odd agreement, which lacks the
long, drawn-out ceremonial verbal statements of stipulatio and fails to fit 
into one of the standardized forms, is unenforceable.  Roman law refuses
to provide a legal remedy to enforce it “nuda pactio obligationem non 
parit” (“a bare agreement does not produce an obligation”).192  Roman 
law refused to enforce naked pacts without a ceremony or a nominate— 
standardized contractual form to publicize the content of the obligations. 
Discussed below, Latin American notary publics inconsistently insist on 
interpreting atypical contracts along the lines of typical molds.  Notary
publics must understand their primary responsibility is to give publicity 
to nonstandardized business deals.
2. Private Choices to Cooperate Without Stipulating 
All Eventualities 
The Roman law of obligations establishes full freedom of contract.193 
However, the principle of freedom of contract is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for realizing a decentralized market economy.194  Law
and economics literature emphasizes that writing a complete contract which 
stipulates all eventualities is often impossible or undesirable because parties
to a contract are incapable of anticipating every future contingency.195 
Moreover, because negotiating and drafting clauses to resolve possible
contingencies and risks is costly, parties may decide to leave remote
contingencies unstipulated.196  Rather than abridging full freedom of
contract, Roman private law supplements, rather than substitutes for,
incomplete contracts with: (1) standardized contractual forms; (2) the
principle of bona fides (good faith)197 of Roman Praetorian law; and       
(3) quasi-contractual obligations.198  Roman law works because it supports
private choices to cooperate without stipulating all eventualities. These
supplemental institutional mechanisms enable people whose rationality is
limited to cooperate despite their inability to completely know and provide 
for the future. 
Roman standardized contractual forms approximate complete contracts.199 
Insofar as the near future will resemble the recent past, Roman private law 
192. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 2.14.7.4 (Ulpianus, Ad Edictum 4). 
193. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 327 (1995).
194. See DEL GRANADO, supra note 3, at 326. 
195. See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the 
Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 190 (2005) (explaining why
contract are incomplete).
196. Id.
 197. BERGER, supra note 33, at 374. 
198. See DEL GRANADO, supra note 3, at 327–33. 
199. Id. at 327. 
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supports personal autonomy by providing a default framework of implicit 
heteronomy.  The nominate contracts in Roman law are based on long 
experience and incorporate supplemental provisions that provide for 
probable contingencies which may escape the attention and present
awareness of contractual parties.  As discussed earlier, each standardized
or nominate contractual form in Roman law includes implied obligations
covering unstipulated matters.  The obligations implied in each typical
form cover the unstipulated eventualities most likely to arise in the
contract with that name.200 
In the Roman legal system, the ius honorarium (law introduced by 
the magistrates)201 developed, adiuuandi uel supplendi uel corrigendi iuris
ciuilis (supporting, supplementing and correcting the civil law),202 which is
similar to the development of equity introduced by the chancery courts
in common law systems.203  Both the ius honorarium and equity supplement
and mitigate the rigors of strict law.204  In classical Rome, the praetor
allowed a defendant to request the insertion of an exceptio doli (exception 
of bad faith) into the procedural formula.205  This addition instructed the
iudex to consider the equity of the case, si in ea re nihil dolo malo Auli 
Agerii factum sit neque fiat,206 (if no fraud has been committed by you as
plaintiff).207  When enforcing any of the four consensual contracts, emptio 
uenditio, locatio conductio, mandatus and societas, or the real contract of 
depositum, the Praetorian formula contains an instruction to the iudex to
consider more than whether both parties strictly performed their legal
obligations quidquid ob eam rem Numerium Negidium Aulio Agerio dare
facere oportet ex fide bona, (whatever the defendant ought to give to, do
for, or is fitting for, the plaintiff according to the principles of good 
faith).208 
200. Id.
 201. BERGER, supra note 33, at 529. 
202. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 1.1.7 (Papinianus, Definitionum 2). 
203. See generally W.W. BUCKLAND, EQUITY IN ROMAN LAW (1911) (describing the 
kinship between Roman and English lawyers) [hereinafter BUCKLAND, EQUITY IN ROMAN
LAW].
204. Id. at 7. 
205. BERGER, supra note 33, at 459. 
206. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 44.4.4 (Paulus, Ad Edictum 7). 
207. Translation taken from S.P. SCOTT, 5 THE CIVIL LAW 60 (1932).
208. See 1 A. H. J. GREENIDGE, THE LEGAL PROCEDURE OF CICERO’S TIME 205–06
(1901). 
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Modern scholars have been unable to fully explain the Roman meaning 
of bona fides.209  However, law and economics suggests that bona fides
allowed Roman law to supplement incomplete contracts.210  When the  
parties are able to stipulate the entire content of a contract, the principle
of bene agere (acting fairly and in good faith) requires that each party
faithfully execute the obligations expressly stipulated, and nothing more.211 
When the parties are unable to stipulate the entire content of a contract,
Roman law does not require the parties to act altruistically, but rather 
requires parties to go beyond the mere express terms.212  Parties are 
required to act with bona fides; to respond to unstipulated eventualities 
without dolus (bad intent)213 or culpa (negligence)214 within the bounds of
foreseeability, non etiam improuisum casum praestandum esse, (should
not be responsible for the unforeseen event).215 
Modern scholars disagree about the exact standard of care that Roman
lawyers applied because they miss the point of Praetorian bona fides.216 
The iudex evaluates on a case-by-case basis whether each party has acted as
a bonus uir (upright man),217 thus the standard of care varies.  Whereas 
modern German civil law fits bona fides into groups of cases or Fallgruppen, 
Roman lawyers adopted a case-by-case approach to iudicia bonae fidei
(controversies to be decided according to the principles of good faith) 
where every situation will be different.  If iudicia bonae fidei could be 
reduced to typical situations, Roman lawyers would have adopted a solution 
based on the standardized contractual forms.218  The Praetorian formula 
instructs the iudex to look at the unique circumstances of each case to figure 
out whether each party acted ex fide bona (according to the principles of
good faith) precisely because the unstipulated eventualities fail to
conform to typical patterns.219 
209. See generally Simon Whittaker & Reinhard Zimmermann, Good Faith in
European Contract Law: Surveying the Legal Landscape, in GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW 16 (Reinhard Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker eds., 2000). 
210. See DEL GRANADO, supra note 3, at 331. 
211. See DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 19.2.21 (Javolenus, Epistularum 11). 
212. See DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 19.2.22.3 (Paulus, Ad Edictum 34). 
213. BERGER, supra note 33, at 440. 
214. Id. at 419; DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 18.1.68 (Proculus, Espistularum 6). 
215. COD. JUST. 4.35.13 (Diocletian & Maximian 290/293). 
216. The concept gets rather short shrift in the literature. E.g., GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS, 
THE HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF ROMAN LAW 34 (2003).
217. BERGER, supra note 33, at 767. 
218. See DEL GRANADO, supra note 3, at 320. 
219. See Richard A. Epstein, The Many Faces of Fault in Contract Law: Or How to 
Do Economics Right, Without Really Trying, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1461 (2009) (discussing
why different standards of fault are proper in different contexts). 
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Incomplete contracting is particularly problematic and expensive
when the causa (reason)220 of a contract is precisely that one party is
better positioned than the other to acquire private information.  Only in
these situations of asymmetric information, does bene agere in Roman
law demand that a party subordinate his interests entirely to the interests
of others.  Roman lawyers approach these situations by applying quasi-
contractual obligations which are subsidiary to incomplete contracts. 
3. Private Cooperation Within Extra-contractual Relationships
Another aspect of Roman law that encourages cooperation involves 
extra-contractual relationships.  Whether the relationships arise through 
mistake, prior circumstances, or consensual acts, Roman private law
recognizes and enforces certain extra-contractual obligations.  In general, 
persons who are supposed to act for the benefit of others are considered 
to have special relationships with each other, despite the absence of any 
express agreement between them.  Roman lawyers refer to certain
obligations as quasi ex contractu (almost arising from a contract). The 
quasi-contractual obligations are similar, but not identical to obligations 
formed through a contract.  Paralleling the closed system of typical contracts 
discussed in Section II.B.2,  Roman lawyers conceived a “closed number” 
of standardized quasi-contractual forms: negotiorum gestio (management 
of another’s affairs without authorization), 221 tutela uel curae gestio
(guardianship or wardship),222 communio incidens (falling together into
common ownership),223 and indebitum solutum (loosening a nonexistent 
debt).224 
In negotiorum gestio, someone undertakes to take care of some business 
or affair for another.225  Roman law requires that the negotiorum gestor
(person meddling in another’s affairs)226 act in the interest of this
other.227  Once begun, the negotiorum gestor must attempt to complete his
obligation,228 and after finishing, he must give a full accounting of his
220. See  FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 149–50 (1876) (explaining
that the doctrine of consideration in the common law descends from the Roman causa).
221. BERGER, supra note 33, at 593. 
222. Id. at 747. 
223. Id. at 400. 
224. Id. at 498. 
225. See WATSON, supra note 184, at 193–207. 
226. BERGER, supra note 33, at 593–94. 
227. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 3.5.6.3 (Julianus, Digesto 3). 
228. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 3.5.3.10 (Ulpianus, Ad Edictum 10). 
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actions to the dominus negotii (owner of the business or affair)229 as well 
as return any fruits he may have acquired.  Because of conflict of interest
problems, a person is prevented from acquiring a private interest in the 
business he oversees. While the Roman law encourages cooperation, it 
also enforces realistic limits.  It prevents what might look like cooperative
arrangements but is actually one person interfering with another’s property.  
Because one meddles in another’s affairs without authorization, no contract 
is freely entered into between the parties to this extra-contractual
relationship.  To avoid officious interference with private interests, Roman
law requires some underlying utility that necessitates meddling in the 
affairs of another: “non autem utiliter negotia gerit, qui non necessariam 
uel quae oneratura est,”230 (“but he does not attend to the matter
[usefully], who adds something which was not necessary, or imposes a
burden“).231  This limit is enforced by denying the negotiorum gestor a 
claim for reimbursement while still requiring the officious negotiorum 
gestor to be liable for culpa levis (slight negligence)232 and casus fortuitus
(unforeseeable accident).233 
In tutela uel curae gestio, someone looks after the affairs of another 
who is a minor or of unsound mind.234  The tutor must look after the
interests of his ward as if they were his own.235  Where the incentives of 
the tutor are not perfectly aligned with the interests of the ward, Roman
private law requires the posting of a bond, the cautio, rem pupilli saluam 
fore (security for the protection of the ward’s property),236 to guarantee the
diligent management of the ward’s affairs.237 
Roman law also applies quasi-contractual obligations, in communio
incidens, where several people unavoidably become joint property holders 
(see Section II.A) and in indebitum solutum, where someone unjustly 
enriches another.238 
229. Id.
 230. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 3.5.9.1 (Ulpianus, Ad Edictum 10). 
231. Translation taken from 2 S.P. SCOTT, supra note 166, at 39. 
232. BERGER, supra note 33, at 420. 
233. Id. at 476. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 3.5.11 (Pomponius, Ad Quintus Mucius 21). 
234. See R.H. Helmholz, The Roman Law of Guardianship in England, 1300–1600, 
52 TUL. L. REV. 223 (1978). 
235. DIG. OF JUSTINIAN 26.7.15 (Paulus, Sententiarum 2). 
236. BERGER, supra note 33, at 385. 
237. J. INST. 1.24. 
238. See generally  UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT: KEY ISSUES IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (David Johnston & Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 2002).  Emily Sherwin
dates the law of restitution back to Roman law. See Emily Sherwin, Restitution and
Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2083 (2001). 
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All quasi-contractual obligations are iudicia bonae fidei.239  The  
Praetorian formula instructs the iudex to review the circumstances of
each case to decide whether a person has acted as a bonus uir. 
Additionally, Roman lawyers refer to certain no-fault obligations as 
quasi ex delicto, (almost arising from a delict).  In civil law, a delict is a 
civil wrong redressable by compensation.240  These obligations are
similar to those imposed as a result of fault or carelessness.  Roman lawyers
conceive of a “closed number” of standardized quasi-delictual forms.
Thus, Roman law subjects the iudex to objective responsibility (“strict 
liability” is the term used by the common law), qui litem suam fecerit
(“he makes a trial his [own]”),241 the sea carrier, innkeeper and stable
keeper whose employees steal or damage the property of a customer,
furtum uel damnum in naui aut caupone aut stabulo, (theft or damage
while under the care of ship owners, innkeepers, or stable keepers)242 
as well as anyone from whose dwelling something is deiectum uel effusum, 
(thrown or poured) onto the street,243 or from whose building something
is positum uel suspensum (placed or suspended) which falls and obstructs
traffic.244 
As I show, Roman private law recognizes and enforces a “closed
number” of both quasi-contractual and quasi-delictual obligations.
However, modern civil law scholars disfavor the Justinianian labels of
“quasi contract” and “quasi delict.”245  These scholars are unable to find 
any common thread linking all of these seemingly unrelated causes of
action.246  Law and economics suggests that what links the motley
collection of personal actions is some kind of pre-existing relationship
between people. These standardized extra-contractual obligations—which 
lie between contracts and delicts—all involve relational obligations. 
239. See DEL GRANADO, supra note 3, at 331. 
240. Under the common law, the old Norman word “tort” describes civil wrongs. 
PETER HODGSON COLLIN, DICTIONARY OF LAW 241 (1999).
241. BERGER, supra note 33, at 519. 
242. Id. at 592. 
243. See KASER, supra note 59, at 216. 
244. Id.
245. See DEL GRANADO, supra note 3, at 332–33. 
246. Nor can the motley collection of situations be subsumed under the law of
restitution for unjust enrichment. See e.g., James Gordley, Restitution Without Enrichment?
Change of Position and Wegfall der Bereicherung, in  UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT: KEY 
ISSUES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 227, 236–37 (Johnston & Zimmermann eds., 
2002).
 331








   
 
  
    
 
 
      
 
  












   
 
  
4. Private Cooperation Between Strangers 
One of the central functions of any legal system is to promote responsible 
behavior.  One way to describe such behavior is consideration for the
interests of others—but expecting altruism would be requiring too much 
of a legal system.  Roman law encourages cooperation between persons 
acting for the benefit of others, even when such persons have not formed
any agreement or are even unknown to each other.  
Modern law uses criminal prosecution by the state’s bureaucracy to 
impose cooperation even among strangers.  Bureaucratic inertia, however, 
where government officials lack both the private incentives and
information, impairs the effectiveness of such prosecution.  Roman law
is more adept in encouraging cooperation because it enables individuals 
to bring legal actions against others for intentional harms, without state 
involvement. 
Roman law protects property and persons through civil rather than
criminal means.  Roman law imposes responsibility for intentional harms
(with dolo malo) through a “closed number” of standardized civil
delicts.247  The standard Roman law delicts include several harms which 
modern law classifies as crimes against persons or property. A wide
variety of behaviors involving the involuntary removal of property from 
the control of its rightful holder, inuito domino (without the owner’s 
consent),248 constitute furtum (theft),249 and if done with force, rapina
(robbery).250 As with modern law, the offense does not include removing
property under the mistaken belief of ownership.251  Roman law iniuria 
(done unlawfully)252 includes many modern crimes against the person.253 
However, as with modern law, the offense does not include injuring
someone negligently during a sports competition.254  Roman private law
prefigures the essential components of a modern legal system.
While Anglo-American common law retains its feudal system of
intentional torts, modern Latin American civil law relies overly on 
criminal, as opposed to civil liability.  The intentional delicts of Roman
247. See  WATSON, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC, supra
note 17, at 220–33, 248–73. 
248. BERGER, supra note 33, at 516. 
249. Id. at 480. 
250. Id. at 667. 
251. DIG. 47.2.21.3 (Paulus, Ad Sabinum 40).  A mental element of contrectatio
(“laying hands on with an intent to misappropriating, meddling with or misusing
another’s property”) was a prerequisite.  See BERGER, supra note 33, at 413. 
252. BERGER, supra note 33, at 502. 
253. See  WATSON, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC,
supra note 17, at 248–55. 
254. DIG. 47.10.3.3 (Ulpianus, Ad Edictum 56). 
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law were left out in the nineteenth century codifications of civil law.
Law and economics literature teaches that private law imposes civil
liability for reasons other than compensating people for their losses or
redistributing wealth or risk in a society.255  Instead, a system of private
law redistributes losses from those who are injured to those who caused
the harms, creating incentives for people to prosecute those who fail to 
exercise due care for others.256 
Moreover, Roman law imposes liability, even for unintentional harms 
(done with culpa). The Roman civil delict, damnum iniuria datum
(damage done to property),257 evolved from a system which imposed
objective responsibility to a system which declared subjective 
responsibility. Law and economics scholars may be puzzled by the 
change.258  A determination of objective responsibility (“strict liability”
in common law) in a case seems more straightforward for a iudex than
establishing the proper subjective standard of care.  Presenting
evidence about inadequate precautions adds to the cost of the litigation. 
Transaction cost economics overlooks the existence of asymmetric
information.  Because people privately observe the costs incurred in
taking precautions and avoiding accidents, private information
asymmetries develop.  Thus a finding of civil responsibility for damnum 
iniuria datum under culpa (negligence) publicizes private
information regarding cost effective precautions and fixes standards of
care in different cases.  For example, someone trimming and pruning a
tree who risks dropping heavy branches onto a public walkway and fails to 
shout a warning is responsible for killing the slave passing by—“si is
in publicum decidat nec ille proclamavit”259 (“where he threw down the
object in a public place, and did not give warning”).260  A farmer who 
chooses a windy day to burn thorny trees and grass is responsible for 
the damage to his neighbor’s crops—“si die uentoso id fecit, culpae 
255. See  GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 26 (1970).
256. See Richard A. Epstein, The Tort/Crime Distinction: A Generation Later, 76
B.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (1996) (arguing that private actions in tort work better than state 
prosecution). 
257. BERGER, supra note 33, at 548. 
258. See  EPSTEIN, TORTS 85, 89–107 (1999) (describing the choice between strict 
liability and negligence as a debate without conclusion in the literature).
259. DIG. 9.2.31 (Paulus, Ad Sabinum 10). 
260. Id., translated in 3 THE CIVIL LAW 338 (S.P. Scott ed. & trans., 1932). 
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reus est”261 (“if he did this on a windy day, he is guilty of
negligence”).262  Asymmetric information explains why Roman
lawyers moved away from objective responsibility and toward defining
explicit subjective standards of care in specific cases.  The later Roman
juristic literature on culpa, thus, publicized the comparative costs of
taking specific precautions, while the earlier no-fault system of
responsibility neither inquired into, nor made public, this private 
information.263 
C. Roman Law of Commerce and Finance 
Roman private law works because it supports the marketplace.  At the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, even conservative political pundits
decried the excesses of unregulated capitalism (i.e., the “free market”).264 
These commentators generally assumed that public law, in the guise 
of a regulatory regime which oversees market participants, must exist 
alongside market institutions.265  At the same time, mechanism design
theory represents a powerful new paradigm.266  A very able—perhaps
incipient—line of law and economics scholarship, at last, is poised to
show exactly how private law, as opposed to public regulation, supports, 
supplements, and corrects markets.  Accordingly, talking about the
vicissitudes of savage capitalism is naïve.  Markets never go unregulated.
As the Roman system shows, private law, rather than public law, is able to 
vitally support, supplement, and correct market institutions. 
The marketplace intermediates between supply and demand through 
the price mechanism.267  Rather than depending on the centralized control 
of a public authority, the price mechanism relies on the decentralized
decisions made by countless private actors.268  Economists tend to assume 
261. DIG. 9.2.30.3 (Paulus, Ad Edictum 22). 
262. Id., translated in 3 THE CIVIL LAW 338 (S.P. Scott ed. & trans., 1932). 
263. The Roman jurists wrote commentaries on the edict and the civil law.  See
ALAN WATSON, THE SPIRIT OF THE ROMAN LAW 57–63 (1995). 
264. Even Judge Richard Posner has entered the fray with two recent books.  See, 
e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT
INTO DEPRESSION (2009); see also RICHARD POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST
DEMOCRACY (2010) (describing how insufficient public regulatory oversight led to the 
crisis).
265. Id.  Judge Posner is mistaken.  The solution to the global financial crisis of
2008, and the market problems we face in the twenty-first century, is to improve private 
legal institutions, rather than increased regulatory oversight. 
266. See discussion of law and economics supra Section I. 
267. JOHN BLACK, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 353 (Oxford 1997). 
268. Market participants adjust prices or quantity up when faced with excess 
demand, and prices or quantity down as a response to excess supply.  At equilibrium, the
price mechanism produces a market-clearing price, at which the quantity demanded
334
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that markets clear effortlessly.269  However, law and economics scholars
know better.270  For markets to clear, intermediaries must make markets.
Market makers are brokers who manage inventories of commercial and
financial assets across space and time. They are able to buy where and
when people want to sell, and sell where and when people want to buy.271 
Roman private law supports the making of markets through the laws 
of property and obligations.  Moreover, Roman commercial and financial 
legal norms allow principals to reduce agency costs either by aligning 
their agents’ interests with their own, or by monitoring their agents.272 
Principals accrue monitoring costs in order to keep agents from hiding 
their actions.273 When a creditor hands over money to a debtor, many of the
actions of the debtor are unobservable by the creditor.274  As a result,  
creditors risk the potential loss of their money.275  In order to support
financial intermediation, as briefly mentioned in Section II.A, the Roman
law of property includes standardized forms of security interests in
another’s property such as fiducia cum creditore contracta (trust concluded
with a creditor), datio pignoris (giving a pledge) and pignus conuentum
(agreed upon pledge), discussed in Section II.C.276  Law and economics
literature clarifies that the collateral pledged must be more valuable to
the debtor than to a creditor in order to align their interests.277  However, 
equals the quantity supplied. See  DONALD RUTHERFORD, ROUTLEDGE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 152 (1992).  In this sense, the market clears. 
269. See Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of Equilibrium for a
Competitive Economy, 22 ECONOMETRICA 265 (1954) (formalizing the assumptions of
general market equilibrium).
270. Instead, law and economics scholarship pays close attention to instances of
market failure, see, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 44–47
(4th ed. 2004) (describing areas of market failure). 
271. Market intermediaries buy and sell with a spread between the asking price and
the bid price. The “bid/ask spread” is the market maker’s profit margin.  See NARAVAN
DIXIT, ACADEMIC DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 21–22 (Isha Books 2005). 
272. The principal-agent problem arises because the agents, instead of acting and 
making decisions for the benefit of the principal, do so for their own benefit and contrary
to the interests of the principal, where the principal is unable to observe the actions of the
agents. See GRAHAM BANNOCK ET AL., DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 307 (4th ed., 2004). 
273. Id.
 274. RUTHERFORD, supra note 268, at 323 (defining lender’s risk). 
275. Id.
 276. See SCHULZ, supra note 45, at 401–27. 
277. George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 246 (1992) (explaining that secured lending allows the creditor to
hold the debtor’s assets hostage); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using 
Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983); ten years earlier, Thomas H.
Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman were close to the answer, but failed to explain how 
 335
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debtors are less able to give up possession of valuable collateral. The
pignus conuentum is especially useful because a debtor pledges property
without delivering possession of the collateral.  Moreover, the Roman law
of obligations enables people to enter into an arrangement of fideiussio
(surety)278 through a stipulatio with the verbal form,279 “Quod mihi debet,
id fide tua esse iubes? Fideiubeo”280 (“Do you guarantee the same? I 
guarantee”).281 Law and economics literature clarifies that a surety
commonly has an ongoing relationship with the principle debtor, or is
better able to observe the actions of the debtor.282  Accordingly, by 
stipulating to an obligation accessory to that of the debtor, the surety
effectively lowers the creditor’s monitoring costs and the debtor’s capital
costs.283 
Moreover, as discussed earlier, the typical Roman consensual and real
standard contractual forms greatly facilitate commerce and finance.
Depositum in sequestre (deposit with one who stands aside) is particularly
useful for usiness transactions or disputes.284  Pending the outcome of a
controversy or the satisfaction of a condition, several parties deposit a 
thing with a sequester (“escrow agent” in the common law) for
safekeeping.285  Once the controversy is resolved or the condition is met, 
the sequester must return whatever the parties deposited to the prevailing 
party or to the party stipulated. 
The Romans also used the verbal contractual form of the stipulatio
with a pactum fiduciae (agreement based on trust)286 to make a
donatio sub modo (donation subject to a limitation).287 As part of a
donatio inter vivos (donation between the living),288 the donor imposes
an obligation on the donee to do something or to make a distribution of
funds.289 The usefulness of a donatio sub modo is that the donor can
stipulate almost anything he wants, and attach a stipulatio poenae
(discussed below in Section IV) to guarantee that the donee will carry
collateral reduces the cost of monitoring the debtor, see Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony
T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143,
1150–61 (1979) (describing the economic basis for secured financing). 
278. BERGER, supra note 33, at 350. 
279. SCHULZ, supra note 45, at 499–502. 
280. G. INST. 3.116. 
281. Id., translated in 1 THE CIVIL LAW 116 (S.P. Scott ed. & trans., 1932). 
282. Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 47 (1999). 
283. Id.
 284. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 13, at 219–20. 
285. DIG. 6.3.6 (Paulus, Ad Edictum 2); DIG. 16.3.17 (Florentinus, Institutionum 7). 
286. BERGER, supra note 33, at 471. 
287. Id. at 443. 
288. Id.
 289. COD. JUST. 8.55 (Philippus 249). 
336
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out the obligations.  If the donee fails to carry out the charge, the donatio
is revocable.290 
A variant of the verbal contract form useful in commercial and
financial transactions is the literal contract form.  Roman lawyers
recognized that some kinds of written records of business transactions 
created enforceable obligations.  Mere annotations made in a codex 
expensi et accepti (cash-book)291 fail to create obligations—“nuda ratio
non facit aliquem debitorem”292 (“a simple statement in an account does
not render anyone a debtor”).293  For example, a ratio mensae (banking 
deposit),294 or a pecunia faenerare (banking loan)295 becomes binding 
only after money is handed over, as in the real contracts. 
Further, Roman lawyers standardized various types of banking
transactions.  Banking transactions typically included interest without
the need to enter into a stipulatio. Charging anatocismus coniunctus
(compound interest)296 was standard practice, at least during the Roman 
classical period.297  Moreover, bankers or argentarii, held auctions for
their clients, devising bidding systems that would attract the highest and
best bidder—“melior autem condicio adferri uidetur, si pretio sit
additum”298 (“better terms are held to be offered where an addition is
made to the price”),299 as well as issuing receptum (promise to pay 
another’s debt)300 through a letter to guarantee payments for clients.301 
Other non-specialized private Roman legal institutions related to
commerce and finance also supported the market.  Modern scholars fail
to recognize that a Roman law of commerce and finance existed.302  The
reason for this may be because it was not a separate body of law—it was
embedded in the basic Roman civil law.303 Modern legal systems separate
 290. KASER, supra note 59, at 56. 
291. BERGER, supra note 33, at 391. 
292. DIG. 39.5.26 (Pomponius, Ad Quintum Mucium 4). 
293. Id., translated in 5 THE CIVIL LAW 31 (S.P. Scott ed. & trans., 1932). 
294. BERGER, supra note 33, at 667. 
295. Id. at 625. 
296. Id. at 361. 
297. See ZIMMERMANN, supra note 13, at 169 & n.87 (clarifying that Justinian
prohibits the charging of compound interest). 
298. DIG. 18.2.4 (UIpianus, Ad Sabinum 28). 
299. Id., translated in 5 THE CIVIL LAW 26 (S.P. Scott ed. & trans., 1932). 
300. BERGER, supra note 33, at 668. 
301. DIG. 13.5.26 (Scaevola, Responsorum 1). 
302. See JOHNSTON, supra note 13, at ix (1999) (arguing that Roman commercial
law has slipped through the consciousness of historians).
303. See DEL GRANADO, supra note 3, at 333. 
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the body of commercial and financial law as a lex specialis from the lex 
generalis of the body of civil law.304  Roman private law was more
congruent because it lacked this separation. The modern ius mercatorum
developed during the Middle Ages between 500 and 1500 A.D.305 
Similarly, many modern commentators fail to recognize that slavery 
was an economic institution.306  The law of slavery was an important 
component of the Roman law of commerce and finance. Roman law
improved the efficiency of ancient slavery by improving slaves’ incentives.
Slavery is a highly inefficient and oppressive legal institution.307 By
giving slaves the option to manage a peculium (fund, land, or business)308 or 
to buy their manumissio (release from power),309 Roman private law 
simultaneously rendered slavery more efficient and less oppressive.310 
As noted above, according to Roman law, property was held by the
paterfamilias (father of a family).311 However, conducting every transaction 
on behalf of his filiifamilias (children under power)312 and slaves was
difficult and time-consuming.  Accordingly, Roman law allowed both 
filiifamilias and slaves to manage a peculium.313  The  peculium is the
property of the paterfamilias.314  However, self interest and social norms 
reinforced a social convention in Roman society requiring the paterfamilias
to respect the peculia of both his filiifamilias and slaves.315  This limit on 
the paterfamilias was in his best interest—without it, a filiusfamilias
would be strongly motivated to commit patricide.  Similarly, this
limit on the paterfamilias better aligned the interests of the paterfamilias
with his slaves’. Without any expectation of manumission, a slave would 
also lack the incentive to exert effort for the benefit of the paterfamilias or 
to share information with him.  The Roman poet Vergil, conveying a 
slave’s despair at his inability to save his way to freedom, said: “nec 
304. See generally Jürgen Basedow, The State’s Private Law and the Economy—
Commercial Law as an Amalgam of Public and Private Rule-Making, 56 AM. J. COMP.
L. 703 (2008) (explaining that mercantile law fails to be state-bound). 
305. See R. C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE LAW
84–85 (D.E.L. Johnston trans., 1992). 
306. See DEL GRANADO, supra note 3, at 333. 
307. See Richard A. Posner, Ethical and Political Basis of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 487, 501–02 (1980). 
308. BERGER, supra note 33, at 624. 
309. Id. at 575. 
310. See generallyALAN WATSON, ROMAN SLAVE LAW 95 (1987). 
311. BERGER, supra note 33, at 620. 
312. SCHULZ, supra note 45, at 154. 
313. Id. at 154. 
314. Id.
315. See JOHNSTON, ROMAN LAW IN CONTEXT, supra note 13, at 100. 
338
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spes libertatis erat nec cura peculi”316 (“no hope of freedom, no thrift of
savings”).317 
Roman law does have at least one overall shortcoming: it lacks a
sufficient system of agency.318  The Roman law consensual contract of 
mandatus is a form of indirect agency, but this is not a sufficient substitute 
for agency-proper.319 The mandatarius is only able to act on his own
behalf, even when he transacts business in the interest of another.320 
However, the Romans were not entirely without agency law.  Both
filiifamilias and slaves were able to act on behalf of the paterfamilias.321 
While this is not a well-regarded solution today, the Roman empowerment 
of the paterfamilias over both slaves and filiifamilias does lower what
modern scholars recognize as a ubiquitous and endemic inefficiency in
modern society: agency costs.  By simultaneously allowing slaves and
filiusfamilias to act for the paterfamilias, and giving the paterfamilias 
enormous power—even ownership—over his agents, Roman law went
a long way in reducing agency costs.322 
Roman law created incentive-compatible mechanisms for information
revelation, thus supporting commercial and financial intermediation. 
The peculium introduced limited liability to Roman law.323 Both 
filiifamilias and slaves were able to manage a peculium independently.324 
Roman law limited the liability of the patrimonium (owner’s equity)325 
for obligations incurred by filiifamilias and slaves to the amount of the 
peculium.326  If either a filiusfamilias or slave incurred a delictual obligation,
the paterfamilias had the option to hand over his filiusfamilias or slave
in lieu of payment.327  In either case, the legal system limited the liability
of the sui iuris (in his own power) to the peculium. The institution of
 316. VERGIL, Ecloga I in ECLOGUES 43, l. 32 at 44 (Robert Coleman ed., 1977). 
317. Eclogue I, THE ECLOGUES AND GEORGICS OF VIRGIL 4 (Longmans, Green, & 
Co. ed., J.W. MacKail trans., 1915) (1889). 
318. See generallyWATSON, ROMAN SLAVE LAW, supra note 310, at 107–08. 
319. Id.
 320. WATSON, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC, supra
note 17, at 149. 
321. See generally  AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, SONS, SLAVES, AND FREEDMEN IN ROMAN
COMMERCE 32–33 (1987). 
322. The power of the business owner over his managers aligned their interests. See 
id at 32–34. 
323. See JOHNSTON, supra note 13, at 101. 
324. Id. at 101. 
325. BERGER, supra note 33, at 622. 
326. See DIG. 15.1.3.11 (Ulpianus, Ad Edictum 29). 
327. See generallyKIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 321, at 17. 
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limited liability enabled people to separate ownership and control in the
economy.328 Roman private law of commerce and finance aligned the
incentives of both paterfamilias and filiifamilias or slaves inasmuch as 
the peculium was the separate interest of the filiusfamilias or slave, less 
the payments to the patrimonium for the cost of capital. 
Roman private law of commerce and finance offered a flexible structure
for business organizations.  The Roman family operated effectively as a
default sole-proprietorship limited-liability entity.  The peculium of a 
filiusfamilias or slave included any res in patrimonio nostro (everything 
included in private ownership).329  Under Roman law, even serui uicarii
(slaves held by other slaves) were deposited in their peculium.330 
Accordingly, a paterfamilias was able, under Roman law, to set up a
taberna or officina and put the business into the peculium of either a 
filiusfamilias or slave.331  The variety of tabernae in the Roman economy
ran all the way from tabernae argentariae (banks) to tabernae deuersoriae 
(inns); from naues instructae or societates exercitorum (fleets of ships) 
to societates publicanorum (companies for purposes of tax collection or 
public works); from tabernae caseariae (cheese factories), to officinae 
lateribus, (brick factories).  The Roman poet Horace, describing such a 
workshop as a fiery hell, said: “dum grauis Cyclopum Uulcanus ardens 
uisit officinas”332 (“Vulcan kindles the awful forge, in which the Cyclops
toils”).333 
Limited liability was the norm in Roman businesses or negotiationes
(commercial or financial businesses)334 held in peculia.335 However, 
Roman law also allowed individuals to choose nonstandard terms in their 
business organization, thus waiving limited liability.  For example, a 
paterfamilias who wished to opt out of limited liability could establish 
his unlimited liability by posting a sign in a visible place in the
establishment, indicating that he runs the business under his own
management.336 
328. See generally A.A. BERLE & G.C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 4–6 (1932). 
329. BERGER, supra note 33, at 677. 
330. WATSON, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC, supra
note 17, at 189. 
331. DIG. 14.4.1 (Ulpianus, Ad Edictum 29). 
332. HORACE, Odes 1.4 in ODES AND EPODES l. 8 at 32 (Niall Rudd, ed. & trans.,
2004).
333. THE ODES AND EPODES OF HORACE: A METRICAL TRANSLATION INTO ENGLISH
56 (E.B.L. Lytton trans., 1870). 
334. BERGER, supra note 33, at 593. 
335. JOHNSTON, supra note 13, at 101. 
336. DIG. 14.3.11.3 (Ulpianus, Ad Edictum 28). 
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As mentioned above, incentivizing an optimum level of savings and 
investment requires markets.337  People fail to know what the future will
bring and never know when they will need to sell and when they will 
need to buy.338  Accordingly, people will only save and invest in
commercial and financial assets if market brokers make markets liquid 
enough so that people are able to buy and sell as needed.339  Moreover, 
participants are similarly unwilling to transact or make investments unless 
commercial or financial assets are accurately priced by the market.340 
Market prices reflect accurate valuations of the utility and scarcity of 
assets when all material private information is publicized.  In addition to 
the information revealing aspects of the law of property and the law of 
obligations, Roman private law includes uniquely commercial or financial
legal norms to support information revelation. 
The uenaliciarii (slave-dealers)341 who frequented the slave market in 
Rome brokered equity capital markets.  Slavery, as discussed above,
lowered agency costs.342  Slaves also constituted a form of living tradable
shares in businesses. The sale of a slave who held a taberna or officina
in his peculium was equivalent to selling the business. Serui communis
(commonly-owned slaves)343 were used in conjunction with the consensual
contractual form of societas to bring rationally ignorant investors together, 
without forfeiting the protection of limited liability.
The Aedilitian regulation of the slave market addresses problems of 
asymmetric information that go beyond supplying a much-needed
skilled labor force.344  The  aedile (magistrate in charge of public
works) required a uenaliciarius (and anyone selling a slave in the 
secondary market) to pronuntianto in uenditione (reveal at the moment
of sale) any material private information affecting the valuation of the
 337. Tibor Scitovsky, The Benefits of Asymmetric Markets, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 135, 
136, 142 (1990) (describing benefits of real-world markets). 
338. Sanford J. Grossman & Merton H. Miller, Liquidity and Market Structure, 43
J. FIN. 617, 619, 620 (1988) (describing market intermediaries as filling gaps arising 
from imperfect synchronization).
339. Id. at 618. 
340. GRAHAM BANNOCK et al., THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 47 (6th ed.
1998).
341. BERGER, supra note 33, at 759. 
342. See WATSON, ROMAN SLAVE LAW, supra note 310, at 107.
 343. BERGER, supra note 33, at 705. 
344. See, e.g., J. A. CROOK, LAW AND LIFE OF ROME 181 (1967).  See also 
Scitovsky, supra note 337, at 138 (stating that the division of labor in society means that 
sellers have more information about their products than do buyers). 
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slave. Moreover, the aedile established objective responsibility (“strict 
liability” under the common law) for the failure to divulge information or
for any contradiction with a dictum promissumue (express warranty) 
given.345  However, nudam laudem (mere puffery or laudation) of a slave
(or business) was excused.346  In addition, Roman law allowed the buyer
of a slave (or business) to institute legal proceedings against the majority 
shareowner or cuius maior pars aut nulla minor est347 of a serui 
communis.348 Law and economics literature explains that information 
revelation gives better protection to market makers than a system which
ex post imposes a penalty on persons for trading with private
information.349 
III. SOCIAL NORMS COMPLETE PRIVATE ORDERING    
IN ROMAN PRIVATE LAW
Inert legal positivism has made a great brouhaha over the possibility 
of combining law and morality.350  The law and economics movement,
however, demonstrates the usefulness of including morality in the law. 
Law and economics scholarship has only begun to explore this
interaction.351  Roman legal scholarship may help law and economics 
scholars better understand how social and legal norms interact. 
The Roman system creates a competitive environment of bounded 
private domains within which both central planning and social norms 
can operate. Roman law removes public regulation from private spaces
and replaces it with private initiative.352 
The Roman law of property defines a domain where the dominus may
act as he chooses (with the limits discussed above in Section I.A.2) and 
protects the possessor who acquired his possession nec vi, nec clam, nec 
precario (not by force, nor stealth, nor license).353  Within the boundaries of 
345. DIG. 21.1.1.1 (Ulpianus, Ad Edictum aedilium curulium 1).
346. DIG. 21.1.19 (Ulpianus, Ad Edictum aedilium curulium 1). 
347. DIG. 21.1.44.1 (Paulus, Ad Edictum aedilium curulium 2).
348. DIG. 21.1.44 (Paulus, Ad Edictum aedilium curulium 2).
349. See generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
86–90 (1966). 
350. See generally JOHN AUSTIN, 1 LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF
POSITIVE LAW (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1875).  See generally H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994). 
351. Early explanations of the interaction between law and morality fail. See Robert 
Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947 (1997) (discussing
the interaction between social and legal norms).
352. Our succession of “oohs” and “aaahs” over Roman private law have been
shared by other scholars in the past.  On the German Pandectists’s embrace of private-
law ideology, see PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 121–23 (1999). 
353. RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW § 54 at 254 (James Crawford
Ledlie trans., 1892). 
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a dominium or of legally protected possession, private property holders or
possessors are able to manage resources without any interference from 
others. Where social norms are more effective in private ordering, a
property owner might allow these informal norms to operate within the 
domain that he controls.354 
The Roman law of obligations includes gratuitous typical contracts, 
such as the consensual contract of mandatum and the real contracts of 
depositum and commodatum.355  Roman gratuitous contracts may seem
odd from a modern vantage point.  However, through these contracts, social 
norms such as fides (trustworthiness),356 pietas (dutifulness toward God, 
parents and relatives),357 munificentia (liberality),358 grauitas (dignity)359 
and amicitia (friendship), 360 alongside complex networks of patronage,
operated to complete private ordering.361 Thus, mutuum was a gratuitous
loan when done to maintain friendly relations between neighbors.
Otherwise, the parties would include a stipulatio to cover the interest
due.362 
Moreover, in classical Roman law, violations of quasi contractual
obligations were publicly frowned upon, carrying the type of stigma 
reserved for criminal convictions in modern society.363   In addition to
legal liability, the legal system imposed a reputational punishment,
infamia (infamy).364  Such extra-contractual relationships presupposed
honest behavior, and a condemnatory judgment for a betrayal of confidence 
attracted social censure and subjected the person to legal and procedural
disabilities. Thus, the private enforcement of social norms acted to
reinforce the efficacy of formal legal sanctions. 
As we have seen in Section II.C., Roman law conflates together
the family and the firm.  Social norms govern Roman family life.  Thus, 
354. O. F. ROBINSON, THE SOURCES OF ROMAN LAW: PROBLEMS AND METHODS FOR
ANCIENT HISTORIANS 89 (1997).
355. ALAN WATSON, THE STATE, LAW, AND RELIGION: PAGAN ROME 41 (1992).
356. BERGER, supra note 33, at 471. 
357. Id. at 630. 
358. CHARLTON T. LEWIS, AN ELEMENTARY LATIN DICTIONARY 52 (1915).
359. BERGER, supra note 33, at 483. 
360. CHARLTON T. LEWIS, AN ELEMENTARY LATIN DICTIONARY 53 (1915).
361. See MOUSOURAKIS, supra note 216, at 45–47. 
362. See WATSON, THE SPIRIT OF THE ROMAN LAW, supra note 263, at 130. 
363. See generally PETER GARNSEY, SOCIAL STATUS AND LEGAL PRIVILEGE IN THE
ROMAN EMPIRE (1970). 
364. BERGER, supra note 33, at 500. See generally A. H. J. GREENIDGE, INFAMIA:
ITS PLACE IN ROMAN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW 18–40, 154–70 (1894). 
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a social convention in Roman society required the paterfamilias to respect
the peculia of both his filiifamilias and slaves. Much of the area that
modern law closely regulates through labor legislation, Roman law largely 
leaves to social norms.365  Under the Roman law of obligations, employment
contracts are largely indistinguishable from other consensual contracts for
hire.366 
Roman law explicitly removes legal regulation from countless areas
where the private enforcement of social norms is more effective than
formal legal sanctions, such as enforcing promises to marry.367  Roman 
private law left an obligatio naturalis (moral obligation) to the internal
moral compass found within every Roman and to the private enforcement
of social norms. Accordingly, Roman legal scholarship offers law and 
economics scholars a rare and unique opportunity to take an up-close 
look at the interaction of legal and social norms in private ordering.
IV. PRIVATE SELF-HELP IN ROMAN LAW PROCEDURE
In Roman law, litigation before an iudex is considered a private contract, 
litis contestatio (bearing witness to an action).368  In order to litigate their
claim or offer a defense, the parties must stipulate before the magistrate
that they will abide by the sententia (sentence)369 of the iudex.370  The 
new contract novates the earlier obligation that formed the basis for their 
claims, defenses, or counterclaims—no matter what their nature.371 
After the litis constitutio, the pre-existing obligations cease to exist.372 
Accordingly, the Roman system of procedure under the control of the 
praetor is a private system of binding arbitration.373 
Moreover, in Roman law, private parties are able to use self-help
measures by executing sententiae. Beyond constituting means for the 
execution of res iudicata (a matter already judged),374 private self-help 
365. Jürgen Habermas is disingenuous when he denies the private character of 
Roman law and makes bold to compare local understandings of Roman social norms 
with public law limitations.  JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF
THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 76 (Thomas 
Burger trans., 1992). 
366. Habermas concedes as much. Id. 
367. CODE JUST. 5.1 (Diocletan & Maximus 293). 
368. BERGER, supra note 33, at 566. 
369. Id. at 700. 
370. GREENIDGE, supra note 208, at 243–48. 
371. Id. at 248. 
372. Id.
373. A defendant rarely refused to confirm or rebut a plaintiff’s claim because he
would be iudicatus (condemned).  GREENIDGE, supra note 208, at 255. 
374. BERGER, supra note 33, at 678. 
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measures provide a means to effectively bring a legal action.375  Any  
creditor whose claim was untrue, yet laid their hands on the debtor
manus iniectio (touching the debtor’s shoulder)376 or took property of the
debtor in pledge, or pignoris capio, risked liability in duplum (in twice 
the amount).377  However, debtors who faced claims knowing they
were true made arrangements for payment, through a confessio in iure
(acknowledgment of plaintiffs claim)378 rather than proceeded before the
iudex, as von Ihering explains.379  Accordingly, manus iniectio and pignoris
capio are private self-help means of collection, able to work without the 
intervention of the curule authorities.380 
If the debtor breaches an obligation, the iudex must assess the value of
the performance to the creditor.  However, establishing quanti ea res 
est381 (what is the value of the thing)382 can be difficult where an
obligation is uncertain.  Accordingly, Roman law allowed the parties
to agree privately on the amount of damages, by entering into a stipulatio
poenae (stipulation to pay a penalty).383  The long-winded ceremonial
statements of the verbal contractual form publicized an enforceable
unilateral obligation to pay a specified amount of damages for a breach
of contract. Moreover, stipulationes poenarum were also a means to
enforce immaterial interests that could not be reduced to a pecuniary 
amount.384  What Anglo-American scholars overlook, and a stipulatio
poenae may capture, is that damages from disappointed expectations are 
often much greater than the amount of the obligation.385 
Lastly, rather than prosecute certain public claims against private
persons, the Roman state privatized tax and debt collection.  Publicani
 375. MOUSOURAKIS, supra note 216, at 137–39. 
376. BERGER, supra note 33, at 577. 
377. Id. at 406. 
378. Id.
379. See generally VON JHERING, supra note 81. 
380. See H. F. JOLOWICZ & BARRY NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 165–66 (3d ed. 1972) (describing legalized self-help). 
381. Dig. 13, 3, 4 (Gaius, Ad Edictum Provinciale 9). 
382. BERGER, supra note 33, at 664. 
383. BERGER, supra note 33, at 718. 
384. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 13, at 97. 
385. See Charles Calleros, Punitive Damages, Liquidated Damages, and Clauses
Penales in Contract Actions: A Comparative Analysis of the American Common Law and
the French Civil Code, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 67, 117 (2006). 
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(farmers of public revenue)386 could purchase these claims and use the
private self-help measures discussed above to satisfy them.387 
V. ROMAN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IN THE RESTATEMENT OF CIVIL
LAW ALONG THE LINES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
The Latin America-Caribbean region must grasp the nettle of
globalization. To survive, each Latin American and Caribbean country
needs a competitive economy.  Many countries in the region liberalized
and privatized their economies in the 1990s, forgetting that their legal 
systems had been socialized and constitutionalized during much of the 
twentieth century under the influence of French legal sociology.388  Latin
American and Caribbean leaders are no longer the naïve backers of an 
earlier state-centered, earlier economic age.  However, the new crop of 
technocrats remains unaware of the extraordinary transformation of the
legal system that must precede privatization of inefficient state enterprises. 
The way that civil law scholars organize the texts of Roman law (or 
Pandects) is called the “system of Pandects.”  The economic analysis
of Roman law suggests a new Pandektensystem within the civil law 
tradition. Rather than classifying legal institutions along the lines of
“persons,” “property,” and “actions,” a law and economics approach
suggests a new arrangement of Roman law.  Civil and commercial law 
must be brought together.  The centuries-old civil law category of 
“modes of acquiring property” should be replaced with a new category 
of “modes of maintaining property.”  Moreover, the “modes of maintaining 
property” should be moved to the book on “property.”  New standardized
forms of rights in the property of others, such as private mineral rights and 
industrial property rights, must be added to the book on “property.”  New 
standardized contractual forms, such as “insurance” and “annuity” 
contracts, must be added to the book on “actions.”  Law and economics 
suggests the expansion of the Roman system of subsidiary quasi-
contractual or relational obligations, undergirded by the principle of
bona fides.389  Law and economics suggests the “depenalization” (“de-
criminalization” in common law) of the legal system and the expansion 
of the Roman system of civil delicts, including the intentional delicts
 386. BERGER, supra note 33, at 661. 
387. See  HILARY SWAIN & MARK EVERSON DAVIES, ASPECTS OF ROMAN HISTORY,
82 BC-AD 14: A SOURCE-BASED APPROACH 363 (2010). 
388. See generally Martin A. Rogoff, The Individual, the Community, the State, and
Law: The Contemporary Relevance of the Legal Philosophy of Léon Duguit, 7 COLUM. J.
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which have all but disappeared from civil law.390  Titles on “commercial 
and financial intermediation” must be added to complement the book on
“actions.”
Most fundamentally, a book on the law of “civil procedure” must be 
brought back into the civil code.  The nineteenth century codifications of 
civil law placed “civil procedure” in the hands of the state and
professional judges. Thus, Napoleon, in an effort to excoriate the excesses 
of the French Revolution,391 promulgated all matters relating to civil
procedure as a separate code, the “Code of Civil Procedure.”392  Bringing 
procedural law back into the realm of private civil law (privatizing legal
procedure) is the most effective way to improve the legal systems of the
Latin America-Caribbean region.  Separate nineteenth century codes for
civil procedure must be reintegrated into civil law. Modern Latin American 
and Caribbean legal systems could incorporate privatized procedural law
through the reintroduction of Roman type arbitration proceedings. 
Here are some other points to keep in mind: Roman law lacks labor
law. Employment contracts are at will—they are treated like any other 
consensual contract for locatio conductio (let hire).393 Roman law lacks
consumer protection law, other than incentive-compatible mechanisms
for information revelation.394  When the emperors intruded into the legal
system, private law created new forms to escape the public law’s most
severe restrictions, such as in the shift from fidepromissio (pledging 
faith)395 to fideiusso (giving faith).396  Roman law lacks antitrust law.
Antitrust law seeks to promote competition through state intervention. 
That is quite a paradox, considering that most limits on competition are 
created by state intervention.  Roman law lacks regulatory law.  Roman
iuris prudentes favored letting markets self-regulate against the background 
of an effective system of private law.  Because Roman private law
390. See generally  ALEJANDRO GUZMAN BRITO, LA CODIFICACION CIVIL EN 
IBEROAMERICA (2000). 
391. The French revolutionaries had sought for a brief, magically elusive moment, 
to move away from public adjudication toward private dispute resolution.  See Alain 
Wijffels, French Civil Procedure (1806–1975), in EUROPEAN TRADITIONS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
26 (C.H. van Rhee ed., 2005). 
392. Id. at 25. 
393. BERGER, supra note 33, at 567. 
394. See Bruce W. Frier, Tenant Remedies for Unsuitable Conditions Arising after 
Entry, in STUDIES IN ROMAN LAW: IN MEMORY OF A. ARTHUR SCHILLER 64–79, 73 (Roger S.
Bagnall & William V. Harris eds., 1986). 
395. BERGER, supra note 33, at 350. 
396. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 13, at 121. 
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enabled the private sector to decentralize the management of resources
effectively, the Roman economy of the second century B.C. achieved
levels of prosperity that remained unparalleled until the late eighteenth 
century A.D. with the beginning of the Industrial Revolution.
Roman law controlled external effects from within property law itself. 
In contrast, both common law and modern civil law uses non-property
doctrines to limit property rights.  In the early twentieth century, French 
legal scholars interpreted a newly discovered Roman text by the jurist 
Gaius about the mistreatment of slaves which suggested that a property
holder may not use his rights with dolus or the intention to do harm to 
another—“male enim nostro iure uti non debemus”397 (“we should not make
a bad use of our rights”).398  Civil law must avoid the use of non-property 
doctrines to avoid external effects that would destroy the value of property.
Moreover, in the early twentieth century, French legal sociology 
undermined the well-worn concept of the ius commune of private subjective
rights.399  French and German legal authors attempted to objectify the
concept of private rights as a “social function” of property—contracts or
companies, provisionally given to private persons to manage, with a 
hesitation ready to blossom into outright distrust under the ever-watchful 
eye of the state.  Private law must leave to owners all choices (allowed 
under the law) with respect to the use, enjoyment, and disposition of
things within private domains.  Private choices to cooperate within what 
the law allows must be left to the private contracting parties.
Contractual rigidity is another modern problem with a Roman 
solution.  Standardized contractual forms are insufficient for the variety 
of private choices to cooperate.  Therefore, social cooperation is hampered
unless people are empowered to form nonstandard atypical contracts.
Atypical contracts in Roman law take the verbal contractual form of
stipulatio with ceremonial trappings.  This alternative means of contracting 
has survived into modern civil law in the form of notarial instruments.
However, modern civil law misses the atypical character of stipulated 
notarial instruments.  Therefore, the civil law system has lost the flexibility
that the Roman stipulatio gave to contractual parties.  The legal scholarship
from the ius commune makes atypical contracts enforceable through the 
doctrine of consideration. The commentator Bartolus misreads a text
that mentions that a stipulatio has a reason or causa (consideration) to
mean that atypical contracts with a causa are enforceable even without 
397. G. INST. 1.53. 
398. See generally LOUIS JOSSERAND, DE L’ABUS DES DROITS (1905).
399. See generally M.C. Mirow, The Social-Obligation Norm of Property: Duguit, 
Hayem, and Others, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 191 (2010). 
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the ceremonial trappings of the stipulatio.400  Although atypical contracts
are enforceable in theory, in practice, modern notary publics often
attempt to make atypical agreements fall into one of the typical standard 
contractual forms. All too often, notary publics rewrite contracts along 
typical standardized lines.  A better alternative would be to follow the 
practice of Roman tabelliones. Tabelliones publicized the atypical 
obligations that contractual parties stipulated, without changing the terms of
the agreements.401  An example of where modern civil law has lost the
flexibility of the stipulatio is the pactum fiduciae to make a donatio sub 
modo.  In civil law jurisdictions today, trust-like relationships—where 
they exist—straitjacket contractual parties with standardized commercial 
contracts that are too rigid, if not utterly inflexible. 
The civil law and the common law are fairly equal in their protection 
and enhancement of freedom of contract. However, the common
law consists of a unique system of quasi-contractual or relational
obligations. The development of the ius honorarium, under which the 
praetor formulated the principle of bona fides, parallels the historical 
development of equity in common law systems.402  In equity, the chancery
courts established quasi-contractual or relational obligations in the form of
“fiduciary duties.”  Latin American civil law needs to go further in this
direction. One way to do this is by following the model of German civil
law in its expansion of the principle of bona fides.403  This expanded bona 
fides accomplishes many of the same tasks that fiduciary duties carry out 
in the common law.404  Unfortunately, German civil law has expanded
the meaning of bona fides to the point where it abridges the freedom to
contract.405  The Fallgruppen (case-study groups) where the principle of
bona fides applies are too broad. 
400. BARTOLUS, DIGESTI NOUI PARTEM COMMENTARIA (1544), on DIG. 44.4.2.(a).3 
(Ulpianus, Ad legem Iuliam et Papiam 19). 
401. BERGER, supra note 33, at 727–28. 
402. See generally BUCKLAND, supra note 203. 
403. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jan. 2, 2002,
BUNDESGESETTZBLATT [BGBL. I] 42, 2909, amended by the statute of Sept. 28, 2009,
BGBL. I at 3161, §§ 138, 157, 242, 826 (Ger.), translated in German Civil Code, 
GESETZE IM INTERNET (2010), http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_ 
bgb.html#BGBengl_000G1.
404. See generally FRANZ WIEACKER, ZUR RECHTSTHEORETISCHE PRÄZISIERUNG DES
§ 242 (1956). 
405. Simon Whittaker & Reinhard Zimmermann, Coming to Terms with Good Faith, in
GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 690 (Simon Whittaker & Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 2000). 
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By far, the greatest danger facing Latin American law today is the
German tradition of constitutionalization of private law—the so-called
doctrine of mittelbare Drittwirkung of fundamental rights in private law, 
made possible through the Generalklauseln that require the observance 
of bona fides in the German Civil Code.406  German law stretches the
principle of bona fides by giving judges the counter-productive ability to
interfere with private choices regarding the substance of contracts.407 In 
this regard, perhaps French civil law is a better model for Latin America 
because it has been less prone to deny freedom of contract.408 
Addressing the problems of Latin America’s legal systems is an
exquisitely difficult balancing act, one legal scholars have shown to
be ill-equipped to handle in the past.  But handle it they must.  In short,
Roman law combined with law and economics are particularly reliable 
guideposts to the paradigmatic private legal system of the twenty-
first century. 
 406. See generally HANS CARL NIPPERDEY GRUNDRECHTE UND PRIVATRECHT (1961). 
 407. Id. 
 408. Id. 
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